AEA Home
AEA

Document Request

You have requested the following article:
Gender-Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores
Alberto Alesina, Andrea Ichino, Loukas Karabarbounis
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. May 2011, Vol. 3, No. 2: Pages 1-40

Gender-Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores

Alberto Alesina, 1

1Harvard University and IGIER, Department of Economics, 1805 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA 02138.

Andrea Ichino, 2

2University of Bologna, Department of Economics, Piazza Scaravilli 2, 40126 Bologna, Italy.

Loukas Karabarbounis3

3University of Chicago, Booth School of Business, 5807 South Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, IL 60637.

Abstract

Gender-based taxation (GBT) satisfies Ramsey's rule because it taxes at a lower rate the more elastic labor supply of women. We study GBT in a model in which labor elasticities emerge endogenously from intrahousehold bargaining. We explore the cases of superior bargaining power for men, higher male wages, and higher female home productivity. In all cases, men commit to a career in the market, take less home duties than women, and have lower labor supply elasticity. When society resolves its distributional concerns efficiently with gender-specific lump sum transfers, GBT with higher marginal tax rates on (single and married) men is optimal. (JEL D13, H21, H24, J16, J22)