Did Austerity Cause Brexit?†

By Thiemo Fetzer*

This paper documents a significant association between the exposure of an individual or area to the UK government’s austerity-induced welfare reforms begun in 2010, and the following: the subsequent rise in support for the UK Independence Party, an important correlate of Leave support in the 2016 UK referendum on European Union membership; broader individual-level measures of political dissatisfaction; and direct measures of support for Leave. Leveraging data from all UK electoral contests since 2000, along with detailed, individual-level panel data, the findings suggest that the EU referendum could have resulted in a Remain victory had it not been for austerity. (JEL D72, F15, F60, H53, I38)

Much of the recent rise of populism in the West has been attributed to a political backlash against globalization. A host of papers suggest that the distributional effects of globalization may causally explain the electoral success of populists (Autor et al. 2016; Colantone and Stanig 2018; Dippel, Gold, and Heblich 2015). Other factors, such as immigration and, in particular, the free movement of labor within the European Union (EU), may have similar distributional effects (Ottaviano and Peri 2012; Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston 2013). Such factors feature prominently in populist rhetoric as well. Globalization, by creating winners and losers, puts specific emphasis on the role of the welfare state (Stolper and Samuelson 1941, Rodrik 2000, Stiglitz 2002). While a functioning welfare state can compensate the globalization’s losers (Antràs, de Gortari, and Itskhoki 2016), welfare cuts may do the opposite. This paper provides evidence that, at least in the context of the United Kingdom, the austerity-induced withdrawal of the welfare state since 2010 is an important driver to understand both how pressures to hold an EU referendum built up, and why the Leave side won.

I proceed in two steps. Using novel data on the universe of all elections held in the United Kingdom between 2000 and 2015, I present a set of observations that highlight

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how the political landscape changed in the United Kingdom in the period from 2010 to 2015 immediately prior to the referendum. I focus on the electoral performance of the UK Independence Party (UKIP). UKIP, established in the late 1990s, was prior to 2016 the only main party in the United Kingdom with the explicit goal of leaving the European Union. Due to the tight correlation between UKIP vote shares and an area’s support for Leave (see Becker, Fetzer, and Novy 2017 and online Appendix Figure A1), UKIP’s evolution is an important window into understanding the build-up of Leave sentiment. Exploiting high-frequency annual election data, I show that the EU referendum was precipitated by a significant expansion in electoral support for UKIP in places with weak socioeconomic fundamentals. For instance, regions with a larger baseline share of residents in “routine jobs” with a larger share of “low-educated” residents, and with higher baseline employment shares in retail and manufacturing all experience an increase in support for UKIP, yet only after 2010.

Why did UKIP gain electoral support in these areas after 2010? Working with district-level data, I present evidence suggesting that austerity-induced welfare reforms initiated in late 2010 contributed to the upheavals in the United Kingdom’s political landscape. The fiscal contraction brought about by the Conservative-led government starting in 2010 was sizable: aggregate real government spending on welfare and social protection decreased by around 16 percent per capita. At the district level, the level at which most administration of welfare spending takes place, welfare spending per person fell by 23.4 percent in real terms between 2010 and 2015. Across districts, the extent of the cuts was widely variable, ranging from 46.3 percent to 6.2 percent, with the sharpest reductions in the poorest areas (Innes and Tetlow 2015). Using data from government estimates on the expected intensity of specific welfare cuts across districts, I show that support for UKIP started to grow in areas with significant exposure to specific benefit cuts after these became effective. As a further plausibility check, I use the austerity shock to estimate multiplier effects on local GDP; this yields estimates that compare well with those in the literature (Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Végh 2013).

The austerity-induced increase in support for UKIP is not negligible and suggests that the tight 2016 EU referendum could have well resulted in a victory for Remain had it not been for austerity (Leave won by a margin of 3.8 percentage points). The point estimates suggest that UKIP vote shares increased by between 3.5 to 11.9 percentage points due to austerity. Given the tight link between UKIP vote shares and an area’s support for Leave, simple back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that Leave support in 2016 could have been easily at least 6 percentage points lower. Because, as this paper shows, support for UKIP is likely to understate the overall impact that austerity had on Leave sentiment, the results suggest that without austerity, Remain would likely have won the EU referendum.

In the second step, I turn to individual-level data constructing a rich panel using the 40,000 household strong Understanding Society study (USOC), which in the most recent wave asked the EU referendum question. These data allow me to address many plausible concerns by exploiting within-individual variation in both political preferences as well as exposure to specific benefit cuts.

The results suggest that individuals exposed to various welfare reforms experienced distinct, sizable, and precisely estimated increases in their tendency to express support for UKIP and, in turn, to support Leave in 2016. Further, they increasingly
perceive that their vote does not make a difference, that they do “not have a say in
government policy” or that “public officials do not care.” Each of these measures is a
strong correlate of support for Leave over and above what can be accounted for when
controlling for respondents’ political party preferences. The timing of the effects is
consistent with individual reforms becoming effective for the affected populations
(for example, households living in social housing judged to have a “spare bedroom”).
Further, for a set of benefit reforms I can document auxiliary effects directly along rel-
vent margins (for example, households living in social rented housing with a “spare
bedroom” avoiding benefit cuts by moving to smaller accommodation). While UKIP
gains among those exposed to cuts, support for the Conservative Party that brought
about the cuts goes down. This suggests that there are political costs to austerity, a
notion for which there is limited evidence in the literature (Arias and Stasavage 2016;
Alesina, Carloni, and Lecce 2011; Alesina et al. 1998).

Lastly, while an in-depth exploration of the underlying economic reasons of why
individuals become reliant on the welfare state (and thus, exposed to austerity) goes
beyond this paper, I provide some suggestive evidence indicating that shocks and
economic trends that contribute to the skill divide in labor markets are likely particu-
larly relevant. I show that, consistent with the literature documenting growing polar-
ization in labor markets (Card and DiNardo 2002; Lemieux 2006; Goos, Manning,
and Salomons 2014), in the past 15 years UK labor incomes diverged along the
human-capital divide. Against this backdrop, the UK welfare state was responsive,
providing growing transfers to those who, in relative terms, were increasingly left
behind. This came to an abrupt halt from 2010, as the welfare reforms started to bite,
marking the onset of the populist backlash. While a host of economic mechanisms
may contribute to the growing skill bias in the economy, the patterns are very con-
sistent with this paper’s central argument, which suggests that austerity was key to
activating these existing grievances, and to producing the sentiment that ultimately
culminated in the Brexit vote.

This paper is related to several strands in the literature. The paper highlights that,
least in the UK context, economic drivers are a nonnegligible factor to understand
the rise of populism. This lies in contrast with research that traces the origins of the
populist wave to a latent cultural drift within Western societies with work such as
Fukuyama (2018), Mutz (2018), and Norris and Inglehart (2019) mostly suggesting
that economic factors are less relevant. In research similar to that of this paper, Dal
Bó et al. (2018) carefully traces the economic origins of the recent rise in the popu-
list Swedish Democrats to policy-induced economic losses exacerbating grievances
between labor market “outsiders” and “insiders.” They suggest that economic pres-
sures may make people more receptive toward messages emphasizing the fiscal costs
of immigration; the effect may be an indirect one, as they suggest that the growth in
anti-immigration attitudes appears second order compared to the overall growth of
distrust among the economic distressed. Guiso, Morelli, and Sonno (2018) studies
the supply- and demand-side of populism. After accounting for turnout, they suggest

1For example, trade integration and offshoring (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013; Scheve and Slaughter 2004),
structural transformation (Rogerson 2008, Rodrik 2016), the rise of automation (Caprettini and Voth 2015, Graetz
and Michaels 2018), technological change more broadly (Acemoglu 1998; Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003) or
possibly due to migration (Becker and Fetzer 2018; Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston 2013).
that economic insecurity is an important driver of demand for populist policies. Also in Sweden, Dehdari (2017) links economic distress to support for right-wing parties, while Algan et al. (2017) documents that in areas and among individuals more exposed to economic shocks in the wake of the financial crisis, support for populist parties and distrust in political institutions grew. Trade integration with low-income countries may similarly have contributed to the build-up of economic grievances; these grievances have been suggested as an important causal factor behind the surge in populism (Autor et al. 2016; Colantone and Stanig 2018; Che et al. 2017; Dippel, Gold, and Heblich 2015). While labor market dynamics are important in contributing to the growing reliance on the welfare state, the results presented here are not confounded by labor market shocks; rather, they capture genuine effects due to changes in the United Kingdom’s welfare system.

Another related literature links the recent rise in populism to various forms of immigration, which typically features strongly in populist rhetoric. While the effects may depend on the underlying type of immigration (e.g., legal or illegal immigration, refugee movements), the literature broadly documents, with a few exceptions, that support for right-wing platforms increases in areas affected by migration (see Mayda, Peri, and Steingress 2018 for the United States; Dustmann, Vasiljeva, and Damm forthcoming in Denmark; and Halla, Wagner, and Zweimüller 2017 in Austria). While anti-immigration rhetoric featured strongly in the 2016 EU referendum campaign, the results presented here suggest that support for UKIP can be associated to an individuals’ exposure to welfare reforms producing distinct grievances.

By documenting that populist voting in the United Kingdom can be linked to exposure to austerity through welfare reforms, this paper relates to a growing literature studying the interactions between political preferences and austerity, or fiscal policy more broadly (Alesina, Carloni, and Lecce 2011; Alesina et al. 1998). A paper closely related to this one is Galofré-Vilà et al. (2017), which links the rise of the Nazi Party in the 1930s to an area’s exposure to austerity. Also related is the work of Ponticelli and Voth (2017), which finds a positive correlation between austerity and popular unrest more broadly. Arias and Stasavage (2016) finds no evidence of a political cost to austerity; its findings are similar to those of Alesina, Carloni, and Lecce (2011). This paper is able to tackle many plausible identification concerns that arise when working with low-frequency election results data, by turning to rich high-frequency individual-level panel data.

The paper presents evidence on a range of further margins, which indicate that exposure to welfare reforms produced tangible grievances that contributed to a consequential political effect: Brexit.

Lastly, the paper naturally relates to a growing literature on Brexit. Most of this work is purely cross-sectional. By contrast, this paper comprehensively adds a time

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2 This builds on a rich literature studying the distributional effects of globalization (Revenga 1992; Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2013; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008; Scheve and Slaughter 2001b).

3 Scheve and Slaughter (2001a) and Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) study preferences over immigration policy in the United States. A rich literature studies the economic effects of migration: Otaviano and Peri (2012) and Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston (2013) find immigration to have small negative effects for US and UK native residents with low human capital.
Colantone and Stanig (2018), following the seminal paper by Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013), finds compelling evidence suggesting that Leave support was distinctly higher in areas of the United Kingdom most exposed to import competition from low-income countries. This paper qualifies these findings, suggesting that post-2010 austerity, by cutting transfer payments to globalization’s likely losers, is an important factor that can explain the timing of the UK’s populist revolt. Further, the paper suggests that the economic origins of exposure to the welfare state (and, hence, to austerity) likely go beyond what can be explained by trade integration alone.

Turning to the consequences of Brexit, Born et al. (forthcoming), using a synthetic control approach, estimates a cumulative Brexit-induced output loss of £19.3 billion, accrued between the EU referendum and the end of the 2017 calendar year. Given that the fiscal savings of the austerity measures studied in this paper were projected to be around £18.9 billion per year, this suggests that the economic costs of Brexit are likely already higher than the austerity-induced fiscal savings that this paper argues significantly contributed to Brexit. More broadly, Dhingra et al. (2017) discusses the cost (and benefits) of the United Kingdom leaving the European Union, while Breinlich et al. (2017) documents the welfare losses due to inflation following the Brexit-induced drop in the value of the pound.

The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I discusses the context and the main data. Section II provides motivating evidence. Section III studies the impact of austerity at the district level, while Section IV turns to individual-level data. Section V concludes.

I. Context and Data

A. UK Politics, the European Union, and the EU Referendum

In 1973, the United Kingdom joined the European Economic Community (EEC), the precursor of the European Union, and held its first “in or out” referendum just two-and-a-half years later, following the Labour Party’s 1974 pledge to renegotiate the terms of British membership of the EEC, and to consult the public in a referendum on whether Britain should stay in the EEC on the new terms. The referendum on June 5, 1975 asked the electorate: “Do you think that the United Kingdom should stay in the European Community (the Common Market)?” The referendum resulted in a decisive victory for Remain with a victory margin of 34.5 percent. Since the 1975 Referendum, the EEC has evolved into the central pillar of what became the European Union with the Maastricht Treaty of 1993. Further steps to European integration were formalized through the treaties of Amsterdam in 1997, Nice in 2001, and Lisbon in 2009.

In parallel to the growing institutionalization of the European Union, opposition to further integration grew in the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom opted out of the single currency and the border-free Schengen travel area. After the Maastricht
Treaty, the UK Independence Party (UKIP) formed out of the Anti-Federalist League, adopting a wider right-wing platform, making it the only significant party in the United Kingdom’s political system that, prior to 2016, had the explicit goal of leaving the European Union (Lynch and Whitaker 2013). UKIP gained traction over time, attracting defectors mainly from the Conservative Party, and developing a footprint in local, European, and Westminster elections. Earlier cross-sectional work suggests that UKIP drew its supporters from two pools of voters: (i) more affluent middle-class “strategic defectors” from the Conservatives who identify with UKIP’s Euroskeptic platform, and, later, (ii) economically struggling, working-class voters with traditional Labour Party backgrounds (see Ford, Goodwin, and Cutts 2012).

Because electoral support for UKIP is tightly related with Leave support in 2016, it provides a good proxy variable to pick up broader “Leave sentiment,” which, as I will show, encapsulates broader measures of disaffection as well. UKIP was seen as a threat to the Conservatives leading the party to adopt anti-EU stances: in March 2009, the Conservatives left the centre-right block in the European Parliament to join a group of right-wing parties, while the 2010 Conservative manifesto set out “to bring back key powers over legal rights, criminal justice and social and employment legislation to the United Kingdom.”

In the run-up to the 2015 general election, UK Prime Minister David Cameron pledged to hold an EU referendum by the end of 2017 if the Conservative Party were to win the election. Reports suggest that Cameron never expected to find himself in circumstances necessitating action on his pledge as he, and most polls, predicted another hung parliament and a continuation of the coalition with the pro-EU Liberal Democrats. Yet, electoral gains for UKIP in England and the SNP in Scotland split the opposition votes, resulting in a surprise outright election win for the Conservatives. After a round of negotiations with the European Union, the EU referendum was called, with Cameron campaigning for Remain in 2016.

The official Leave campaign and UKIP’s own Leave campaign used an aggressive populist campaign that likely would have resonated well in areas most affected by austerity. Throughout, the Leave campaign wrongly claimed that the “United Kingdom sends £350 million to the European Union every single week.” The correct figure is £181 million, amounting to 1.2 percent of overall UK government spending. The campaign suggested that the United Kingdom’s contribution to the EU budget could be used to support the National Health Service (NHS), which faced pressures that the campaign in turn blamed on immigration. The campaign highlighted that “layoffs and hospital closures continue throughout the United Kingdom” because “money is running out,” stoking fears about whether “your local NHS [could] survive.” The campaign suggested that leaving the European Union was without risks as the United Kingdom would hold all the cards in any subsequent negotiations with the European Union. It suggested that the United Kingdom

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6 The following in-line quotes are from advertisements run by the Vote Leave campaign. These have been made available following a UK Parliamentary investigation in late July 2018 and can be accessed online: https://goo.gl/UtX2QG.

could retain the benefits of EU membership without meeting any of its obligations, and it implied that a windfall profit would result from leaving the European Union “to spend on OUR PRIORITIES and NOT THEIRS.” Similarly, the campaign suggested that immigration is to blame for cuts in the UK health care system as “local hospitals are shutting down across the United Kingdom because of pressures from EU immigration policies.”

The campaign further claimed that “the European Union acts overwhelmingly in the interests of big business and against the interests of workers,” and suggested that remaining in the EU would erode workers’ rights. Lastly, the campaign suggested that UK public money was wasted by supporting luxurious lifestyles of “corrupt” EU bureaucrats; it contended that “EU officials wasted thousands of pounds on elite chauffeur services and prestige cars.” It is not inconceivable that this type of campaigning was particularly effective in areas and among people most affected by austerity. After a 10-week campaign period, Leave narrowly won the referendum with 51.9 percent of the votes on June 23, 2016.

B. Measuring Leave Sentiment

Throughout this paper, the electoral performance or expressions of support for UKIP is a key outcome variable. I next describe both the data on the electoral performance of UKIP across elections, and the individual-level panel data.

Election Data.—I leverage data from the population of electoral contests between 2000 to 2015, drawing on data from Westminster, European, and local council elections in this time frame, as well as from the 2016 EU referendum. The performances of UKIP across the different types of electoral contests over time are presented in panel A of [Figure 1]. Support for UKIP surged significantly after 2010 across all election types, yet, the overall levels of support for UKIP are different, which is due to the different electoral systems and due to the way election results are reported. Westminster elections are conducted using a first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system, which results in voters casting their votes strategically, favoring large parties. As a result, UKIP, like most other small parties, has performed quite poorly, with its vote share being well below 10 percent prior to 2010. Yet, in 2015 UKIP came in third, winning 12.6 percent of the popular vote, while still only winning a single seat (which was held by a Conservative Party member who had defected to UKIP), highlighting the distortions introduced by FPTP. Constructing consistent measures of an area’s population’s political preferences across Westminster elections is difficult due to regular constituency boundary changes. Bearing in mind these caveats, I harmonize the results across elections to the 2001 constituency boundaries using

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8 UKIP’s 2015 manifesto was not campaigning on a very distinct anti-austerity platform compared to, for example, Labour. Their manifesto was similar to Labour’s by promising to revoke the “bedroom tax” for example; it mainly stood out suggesting that the United Kingdom leaving the European Union would produce a fiscal windfall to be spent on preserving the NHS. Similar funding pledges for the NHS, albeit not linked to EU membership fees, were included in Labour’s manifesto.

9 Summary statistics of the main variables are provided in online Appendix Table A1.

10 A further distortion may be introduced since not all parties field candidates in each constituency. After 2001, this is not a major concern for the analysis as UKIP fielded 496 candidates in 2005, 558 candidates in 2010, and 624 in 2015 across roughly 650 potential seats.
The resulting dataset is a balanced panel of 570 harmonized constituencies in which I measure UKIP’s vote share; I assign an area with a 0 if UKIP did not field a candidate there.

I also leverage data from the European Parliamentary (EP) elections held in 2004, 2009, and 2014. These elections report results at the local authority district level. Importantly, they essentially use proportional representation to allocate the British seats in the European Parliament. Not surprisingly, as strategic voting concerns

detailed ward-level shapefiles together with 2001 population figures. The resulting dataset is a balanced panel of 570 harmonized constituencies in which I measure UKIP’s vote share; I assign an area with a 0 if UKIP did not field a candidate there.

Notes: Panel A presents the average UKIP vote share across the European, Westminster, and local elections since 2000. Panel B includes the share of respondents in the USOC data who state that they are a supporter of UKIP, feel closer to UKIP compared to other parties or, among those stating they would vote, express that they would vote for UKIP if there was an election tomorrow. This follows the way the USOC instrument elicits political party preferences, which is detailed in online Appendix Figure B1.
do not weigh in, UKIP has significantly higher vote shares, increasing from 15.6 percent in 2004 to 26.6 percent in 2014. The extent and the spatial distribution of UKIP support base across EP elections changed significantly between 2004 and 2014, as Figure 2 illustrates. UKIP gains since 2004 are most concentrated in the coastal regions, Wales, and parts of the industrial areas of the Midlands. Panel C presents the spatial distribution of the 2016 EU Leave vote share, for which the official counting areas were also the 380 local authority districts; the map highlights the tight relationship between an area’s support for UKIP and support for the Leave already alluded to earlier. While EP elections use proportional representation, and
are thus able to pick up protest voting quite well, EP elections usually have low turnout. Further, EP and Westminster elections happen only infrequently, which may limit the statistical power of analysis exploiting time-varying shocks.

To navigate the issue of the low-frequency nature of EP and Westminster elections, I also make use of local council election data for England and Wales since 2000. Local elections have an appealing feature in that, rather than happening uniformly across the United Kingdom every four years, such elections may take place in any given year across the United Kingdom due to the rotating fashion by which councilors are elected. Panel A of Figure 1 highlights that across local elections, UKIP’s vote share hovered between Westminster election performance (as lower bound) and European election performance (as upper bound), ranging from between 5 percent and 12 percent in the 2004–2009 period, and peaking at 22.7 percent in 2013. Yet, the figures are likely downward biased because most local elections are conducted at the local ward level, while election results are collated at the level of the local authority district. This implies that if UKIP does not field candidates in each of the races at the ward level, UKIP’s vote shares are mechanically downward biased as wards that were not contested mechanically contribute zero votes.

While each of the different types of election results data has its own advantages and disadvantages, the results focusing on election outcomes are robust across election types. I next detail the individual-level panel data, which allow for sharper empirical designs and finer outcome measurement.

**Individual-Level Panel Data.—** This paper leverages a newly constructed individual-level panel dataset, making use of the University of Essex (2018) USOC panel study with approximately 40,000 households contributing across the United Kingdom. Participating households are visited, on average, every year. Interviews are carried out face to face in respondents’ homes by trained interviewers or through a self-completed online survey. Respondents are coded based on the residence at the district level and in this paper, I use data from the first eight waves covering the years from 2009 to 2016. Given the gradual data collection, I can construct a quarterly individual-level unbalanced panel.

The survey instruments used across waves are quite harmonized. In particular, each survey wave includes an instrument eliciting respondents’ and households’ sources of income and employment status. Further, most survey waves include a module to elicit political preferences. Respondents are first asked “whether they see themselves a supporter of a specific political party” or “whether they are closer to a political party compared to another.” If neither of these questions is successful in eliciting a response of a party name, the remainder of the respondents are asked which party they would vote for if a general election were held tomorrow. The resulting answers are coded as dummy variable if respondent expresses support for UKIP.

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11 Terms last for four years, and most councils hold elections by “thirds” with one-third of the seats up for election each year, and with no election held one year. See online Appendix B.1 for more details.
12 The ward-level boundaries are changing over time; as of 2014, there were 9,456 electoral wards.
13 Results are robust to restricting to districts in which UKIP almost continuously contested.
Panel B of Figure 1 presents the share of respondents expressing support for UKIP over time. The plot highlights that support for UKIP surged from around 2013 onward, and remained distinctly high among individuals directly exposed to any of the three welfare reforms studied in detail in Section V. In addition to asking questions about political party preferences, survey waves 2, 3, and 6 included further measures of broader dissatisfaction or discontent, asking questions of individual’s perceived political influence (whether individuals think their vote makes a difference), the extent to which they think that "public officials do not care" or that they have “no say in what government does.” I use these measures as further outcome variables capturing broader discontent and anti-establishment sentiment. These sentiments are strongly associated with Leave preferences and also strongly increase among those exposed to welfare reforms. Further, as I later discuss in detail, the data allow me to study other adjustment margins directly relevant to some of the reforms studied. Lastly, the most recent USOC wave 8 actually asks the EU referendum question, providing an additional, immediately relevant outcome measure, which I will link with the empirical analysis of support for UKIP and the measures of broader discontent.

I next present a range of stylized facts used to motivate the subsequent analysis.

II. Where (and When) Did UKIP Start to Grow?

I first present a range of stylized facts, which highlight that UKIP support distinctly grew in areas with weak socioeconomic fundamentals, but only after 2010.

A. Empirical Specification

Using data from the local, Westminster, and EP elections, I estimate the following regression:

\[ y_{i,r,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_{r,t} + \sum_{t \neq 2010} \eta_t \times Year_t \times X_{i,baseline} + \epsilon_{i,r,t}, \]

where \( y_{i,r,t} \) denotes UKIP vote shares in council, Westminster, and EP elections. The fixed effect \( \alpha_i \) absorbs any time-invariant differences in political preferences or sentiment across districts. Region-by-time fixed effects \( \beta_{r,t} \) capture nonlinear time trends specific to each of the 11 regions across the United Kingdom. The main coefficients of interest are the interaction terms between (fixed) baseline socioeconomic characteristic \( X_{i,baseline} \) and a set of year fixed effects. I plot out the estimated coefficients \( \hat{\eta}_t \) over time relative to 2010 as the reference year (2009 for the EP elections) to capture how UKIP differentially gained support over time as a function

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14 Hence, for a significant share of respondents, preferences are elicited without election framing; I further can directly tackle issues concerning prospective turnout as respondents can state that they would not vote or support any party (Bursztyn et al. 2017; Guiso, Morelli, and Sonno 2018). More details on the data are provided in online Appendix B.2.

15 Local Council election results, similar to EP elections, are reported at the district level; the Westminster election results data are presented at the harmonized 2001 constituency level.
of $X_{i, \text{baseline}}$. Throughout the paper, standard errors are clustered at the district level (constituency level for the Westminster election analysis).\(^{16}\)

I focus on four main characteristics $X_{i, \text{baseline}}$ that stand out due to their prominence in the cross-sectional analysis of the Leave vote and their relevance to the wider literature: the share of the 2001 resident population with no formal qualifications, the share working in routine jobs, and the working-age resident population shares working in the manufacturing and retail sectors.\(^{17}\)

**B. Results**

I discuss results for the local elections presented in Figure 3 in more detail.\(^{18}\)

*Human Capital.*—Panel A of Figure 3 focuses on a baseline proxy measure of an area’s population’s human capital. The results suggest that support for UKIP gradually trends up as a function of the share of the resident population with low educational attainment. The correlation between support for UKIP and the measure of low human capital only becomes sharply stronger after 2010.

*Routine Jobs.*—In panel B of Figure 3, I present results when studying how the degree of correlation between support for UKIP in local elections and the share of an area’s working-age population employed in routine jobs as per the Census socioeconomic status classification. Prior to 2010, support for UKIP is not statistically associated with the share working in routine jobs. Since 2010, this correlation becomes sharply stronger, which can account for, on average, 7.5 (or 6.7) percentage points of the increase in UKIP vote shares in local elections since 2010 (in EP elections between 2009 and 2014).

*Economic Structure.*—Lastly, panels C and D of Figure 3 zoom in on measures of a district’s local economic structure, focusing on employment shares in retail and manufacturing sectors. The latter is of particular interest due to the manufacturing sector’s exposure to trade integration. The retail sector is represented all across the country, and the sector is, for the bulk of jobs, not directly subject to global trade exposure; at the same time, however, it provides relatively low-quality jobs, and is likely indirectly affected by contractions in consumer spending. Areas with larger employment shares in retail and manufacturing saw significant increases in electoral support for UKIP after 2010. As we will see, these sectors are disproportionately affected by the contraction in local area incomes due to austerity.

*Discussion.*—The observation that UKIP, after 2010, starts to thrive distinctly in areas characterized by low educational attainment, and a significant share of the

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\(^{16}\) Districts are the main meaningful subnational administrative unit in the United Kingdom. Results are robust to computing spatial HAC errors or clustering at a higher level statistical area.

\(^{17}\) Online Appendix C.1 shows that patterns presented here are robust to alternative fixed effects, different sample cuts and broader or more refined baseline measures. Further, in online Appendix C.2, I document that the growth of UKIP is mostly at the expense of the Conservative party.

\(^{18}\) Online Appendix Figures C1 and C2 highlight that I obtain very similar results studying UKIP’s performance in EP and Westminster elections.
population working in routine jobs or in manufacturing or retail suggests that the underlying causal drivers of the EU referendum may go beyond what is currently known. The extent of knowledge on this issue has been limited because most papers thus far have studied the topic using cross-sectional data. A central question is why the structure of support for UKIP only changed so rapidly after 2010. The next sections presents evidence on how austerity is the likely causal factor explaining these trends, starting with aggregate district-level evidence in Section III and then moving to evidence from individual-level data in Section IV.

19Colantone and Stanig (2018) suggests that import-competition may be an important causal factor that can explain Leave support. In online Appendix Figure C6, I partial out nonlinear time trends in their main measure along with trends in manufacturing employment. Throughout, the patterns remain intact suggesting that import-competition may only explain a part of the Leave vote.
III. Austerity as Activating Factor?

I next present evidence from aggregate data suggesting that austerity measures are likely factors behind the shift toward UKIP.

A. Aggregate Trends in Fiscal Spending

In the wake of the financial crisis, the Conservative-led coalition government that came to power after the May 2010 General Election brought forward wide-ranging austerity measures to reign in public-sector deficits. The government cut spending across all levels of government. Panel A of Figure 4 suggests that, starting in 2011, spending for welfare and social protection dropped significantly, declining by 16 percent in real terms, falling to levels that had last been seen in the early 2000s. Spending on health care, which was spared direct cuts, flatlined. Yet the rapidly aging population added pressures on health care services. Further, spending on education contracted by 19 percent in real terms, while expenses for pensions steadily increased, suggesting a significant shift in the composition of government spending.

The Conservative-led government used three methods to cut spending. First, the initial wave taking immediate effect with the announcement of the autumn budget in 2010 cut budgets for day-to-day spending across most Westminster departments.20 Local government funding fell significantly, putting pressures on local councils to

20The Department for International Development and the Department for Health, which funds the National Health Service (NHS), were spared cuts.
provide services, despite increasing demand due to population growth (Innes and Tetlow 2015). A second significant component took the form of nominal freezes. From 2011 to 2013, the government froze salaries of public-sector employees earning more than £21,000. Beginning in 2014, it capped public-sector wage growth at 1 percent. Similar freezes were introduced for most welfare benefits, resulting in cuts in real terms, as inflation averaged between 2 and 4 percent throughout this period. In this paper, I focus on the third important component of austerity, the reform of the welfare state, which was set in motion through the Welfare Reform Act 2012.

B. Exposure of Welfare Cuts at the District Level

I draw on data from Beatty and Fothergill (2013), which, using detailed data on the distribution of claimants across different types of benefits before reforms became effective, provides an estimate of the incidence of the different welfare cuts at the district level. Beatty and Fothergill (2013) considers 10 different measures, which, taken together, were expected to yield fiscal savings of up to £18.9 billion per year by 2015. The estimates of the intensity of exposure of an area to the welfare reforms are “deeply rooted in official statistics” drawing in “data from the Treasury’s own estimates of the projected savings, the government’s impact assessments, and benefit claimant data.” The exposure of an area to specific reforms is measured as the financial loss per working age adult in a district and year. The aggregate figure masks a wide range of variation in the intensity of treatment, which is driven by the heterogeneity in the distribution of benefit claimants across the United Kingdom prior to the reforms. This variation is visually presented in panel B of Figure 4. The overall projected financial loss per working adult varied between £914 in Blackpool and £177 in the City of London.

The measures with the largest effect were the reform of tax credits, changes to child benefit, and the capping of benefit increases to account for inflation to 1 percent per year. Tax credits are a means-tested transfer to households to top up low incomes; child benefit is an unconditional benefit paid out to families. The reform of tax credits involved a faster withdrawal of the transfer payment as income grows, in addition to a host of changes to eligibility requirements. This complexity makes identifying the affected group in the population difficult because exposure depends on a range of characteristics. In the case of child benefit, the main measure was to make the benefit means-tested withdrawing child-benefit from better-off households with at least one earner with an annual pre-tax income above £50,000.

According to the estimates from the Department for Work & Pensions, these three measures alone were expected to generate around £10 billion in savings per year by 2015. It is estimated that changes to tax credits and child benefit affected between 4.135 million to 6.980 million households, or roughly between 15–25 percent of the 27.2 million UK households. My paper demonstrates that these specific

21 Online Appendix B.3 provides more detailed description of the data.
measures, while having small direct effect on individual households, had sizable indirect effects on the local economy.22

In the individual-level analysis, I focus on three smaller welfare reforms (the abolishment of council tax benefit, the so-called “bedroom tax,” and the introduction of Personal Independence Payments replacing Disability Living Allowance) about which I provide more detail later in Section IV. I first estimate the impact of the overall welfare-reform austerity measures on voting outcomes, incomes, and support for Leave.

C. Empirical Strategy

I perform three related exercises. First, I estimate a difference-in-differences specification to study how support for UKIP distinctly grew after 2010 in areas more exposed to cuts across local, European and Westminster elections. I further explore an event study design similar to specification (1), where I replace the measure $X_{i,baseline}$ with a measure the exposure of district $i$ to welfare reform $j,Austerity_{i,j}$. Further, I study a specification allowing me to estimate local multipliers. The pooled difference-in-differences specification takes the following form:

$$y_{i,r,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_{r,t} + \gamma \times 1(Year > 2010) \times Austerity_{i,j} + \epsilon_{i,r,t}.$$ 

The only difference compared to the earlier event studies specification (1) is that the treatment periods are pooled together. As we will see when studying the event studies as second exercise, this is likely to underestimate the specific impacts of some benefit cuts that only became effective starting 2013.

For the third exercise, the estimation of local multipliers, I obtained district-level data from the Office of National Statistics (ONS) on local area gross value added by sectors.23 I also estimate an event study to highlight that contractions in district GDP due to austerity only occur after austerity takes effect. Lastly, I show that exposure to austerity, changes in support for UKIP and higher levels of support for Leave in 2016 in the cross section are tightly linked.

D. Results

I first discuss the pooled difference-in-differences results, before turning to the event studies and the estimates of the multipliers.

**Pooled Difference-in-Differences.**—The results from estimating specification (2) are presented in Table 1. The rows explore UKIP’s electoral performance in local, European, and Westminster elections, while the columns explore the different welfare reform $j$-specific measures $Austerity_{i,j}$ taken from Beatty and Fothergill (2013).

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22 In total, the paper studies five measures in some detail. The other reforms are indirectly accounted for in the overall austerity impact measure. Online Appendix B.3 explains how data availability guides the focus on these reforms.

Column 1 studies the impact of the overall estimated impact of the reforms. The average anticipated financial loss per working-age adult was estimated to be £447.1. Given that the median household disposable income in the United Kingdom stands at just around £27,300, this is a nonnegligible amount. The point estimates indicate a strong positive relationship between the austerity exposure and UKIP’s electoral performance. Computing the full in-sample distribution of point estimates implied by column 1 suggests that UKIP’s electoral performance increased, on average, by 6.5, 3.5, and 3.8 percentage points across local, European, or Westminster elections respectively after 2010.

Columns 2–6 zoom in to a set of specific benefit cuts, in particular, changes to tax credit (TC) and child benefit (CB). For the former, I find sizable effects on support
for UKIP, while for the latter the results are more mixed. This is due to the nature of the child benefit cut, which affected relatively well-off households. Other key welfare reforms (which are described in detail in Section IVB)—abolishing council tax benefit (CTB) and the Disability Living Allowance (DLA), and the bedroom tax (BTX)—almost exclusively affected low-income households. For these benefit cuts, I have reasonably sharp timings and eligibility rules that I can trace out in the individual-level data. Across most of these specific reforms, the aggregate election data suggest similar sized effects across panels A–C.

At the bottom of Table 1, I provide some summary statistics on the size and distribution of the cuts. For example, the bedroom tax explored in column 6 was expected to yield fiscal savings of just £10.81 per working-age adult; yet, the measure was much more concentrated, affecting an estimated 660,000 households. Further, I also provide the correlations between the share of working age households affected by the reforms and the baseline district measures explored in Section II. This highlights nonnegligible cross-correlations between an area’s exposure to austerity and these measures, indicating that indeed, benefit cuts were particularly concentrated in areas with significant resident shares with low qualifications or significant working-age adult populations working in routine jobs.

**Event Studies.**—The pooled difference-in-differences analysis, by averaging the coefficient estimates after 2010, may underestimate the effect of austerity. Welfare cut measures, such as freezing of benefits, or changes in inflation indexing, compound over time, while others only become fully effective at a later date. This only affects the local election results, because for Westminster and EP elections, only a single election occurred in the time window between 2010 and 2015 before the referendum. Nevertheless, looking at Westminster and EP elections is still useful in terms of whether support for UKIP in more austerity-exposed areas followed similar trends prior to the time when the reforms took effect.

While the vast majority of benefit cuts were introduced as part of the Welfare Reform Act 2012 and became effective with the start of the financial year in 2013, some measures, such as reforms to tax credits or nominal freezes had already taken effect in 2011. In the event studies presented in Figure 5, I focus on the overall austerity exposure measure in panel A, as well as three individual policies further detailed in the next section. Throughout, there is no evidence of systematic divergence before 2011 in a fashion that is correlated with exposure to austerity. Markedly, the timing is also quite consistent with the specific measures. The first effects appear in 2012 for the overall austerity measures in panel A, which is significantly carried by the tax credit reforms taking effect from April 2011. The estimated coefficient for the year 2015 is, not surprisingly, larger compared to the pooled difference-in-differences estimates: the full distribution of implied effect sizes across England and Wales suggests that the main austerity measure can explain an increase in support for UKIP of 11.9 percentage points by 2015.

Panels B–D focus on three reforms further detailed in the next section: the abolishment of council tax benefit, the so-called bedroom tax, and the introduction of Personal Independence Payments replacing Disability Living Allowance. There is no evidence of diverging pre-trends for any of these reforms. The timing of each of
the effects is quite consistent with the times at which various measures (particularly for the abolishing of the council tax benefit) took hold.24

Local Multipliers.—I estimate local spending multipliers as a further plausibility check. The average local authority district was expected to lose £447.1 per working-age adult in transfer income, which should result in further indirect contractions of local incomes. I estimate these multiplier effects using data on local-area GDP estimates. The only difference from the main estimating equation is that the dependent variable now is the log value added per working-age adult by sector, while the independent variable is the overall austerity-exposure measure.

The results are presented in online Appendix Table A3. The estimates suggest a significant negative relationship between austerity exposure and local GDP: for every pound contraction in transfer income to working-age adults, local-area gross value added contracts by around 2.4 pounds. The multiplier effects are broadly

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24 Online Appendix Figure A2 presents the same figures for Westminster elections. Online Appendix Figure A3 looks at EP elections. In Westminster elections there are no evident pre-trends, while for EP, there are noteworthy trend-changes after 2009. Further, results are robust to linear time trends as evidenced in online Appendix Table A2.
carried by contractions in the distribution and retail sectors, as well as by the manufacturing sector. The magnitude of the multipliers and the distribution across sectors are quite consistent with estimates in the wider literature (Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Végh 2013).  \(^{(25)}\)

**Austerity, UKIP, and Leave Support in 2016.**—The previous results suggest that austerity, at the aggregate level, is consistently and significantly associated with the steep rise in support for UKIP after individual austerity measures started to take effect. In turn, changes in support for UKIP across elections and the Leave vote are also tightly linked. In column 1 of online Appendix Table A4, I highlight that areas exposed to austerity experience higher levels of support for Leave in 2016. Similarly, column 2 suggests that areas that see marked swings to UKIP across the three election types studied also see higher levels of support for Leave in 2016. Across election types, the estimated coefficients suggest that a 1 percentage point larger swing to UKIP is associated with a 0.9 to 1.9 percentage point higher level of support for Leave in 2016. Column 3 further highlights that changes in support for UKIP are tightly correlated with the district-level austerity exposure: after controlling for the swing to UKIP, the coefficient on the austerity measure shrinks markedly. This suggests that a lot of the variation that drives the correlation between the austerity measure and the Leave vote share can, in fact, be captured by the change in support for UKIP.

I next turn to use these observations to provide back-of-the-envelope calculations. The estimated effects of austerity and UKIP are sizable and substantially meaningful: *a victory for Remain* in the 2016 EU referendum would have been much more likely, had it not been for austerity. Taking the point estimates from column 2 of online Appendix Table A4, which links changes in support for UKIP with Leave support in 2016, I can obtain estimates of the potential impact that austerity had on support for Leave.

For European election, the previous analysis suggests that the austerity-induced increase in support for UKIP of around 3.5 percentage points may have translated into up to \(3.5 \times 1.9 = 6.7\) percentage points higher levels of support for Leave. For local elections, the full distribution of pooled difference-in-differences estimates suggested that the austerity exposure can account for, on average, a 6.5 percentage point increase in support for UKIP. Taking the corresponding point estimate from online Appendix Table A4 suggests that Leave support could have been at least \(6.5 \times 0.9 = 5.9\) percentage points lower. In the event studies for local elections, the analysis suggested that the increase in support for UKIP by 2015 that can be attributed to the main austerity measure is 11.9 percentage points. This would suggest that Leave support in 2016 could have been up to \(11.9 \times 0.9 = 10.7\) percentage points lower. This implies that even conservative estimates would suggest that Remain would have won the EU referendum had it not been for austerity.

Despite the consistency of results in terms of timing, magnitude, and election types, a range of concerns still make it difficult to interpret the results in a causal fashion. In particular, selection into benefit receipt could be endogenous to an area’s

\(^{(25)}\) Online Appendix Figure A4 shows that there are no pre-trends in local area gross value added across districts and that the contraction is tightly related with the onset of austerity after 2010.
exposure to austerity. In addition, austerity may affect political preferences, and contribute to the build-up of Leave sentiment more broadly in ways that do not necessarily operate solely through changes in support for UKIP. Lastly, the observed changes in the election results could also reflect changes in composition of turnout (Guiso, Morelli, and Sonno 2018). To tackle these concerns, I next turn to an individual-level panel, which will allow me to get cleaner identification by tracking pools of individuals affected by specific welfare reforms over time.

IV. Turning to Individual-Level Evidence

To overcome the issues highlighted when studying aggregate data, I turn to individual-level panel data constructed from the USOC study starting in 2009.

A. Capturing Individual Exposure to Welfare Cuts

The main advantage to using individual-level data is that, in addition to providing multiple reasonable outcome measures capturing facets of political preferences, it can be used to construct more refined measures of an individual’s exposure to reforms. The USOC survey contains an “Unearned Income and State Benefits module,” which asks the respondent questions about their receipt of benefits. This allows the identification of reasonably clean subsets of individuals who received benefits of certain types and were thus exposed to reforms.

The substantive concern for causal identification is selection. Individuals can be exposed to austerity in three different direct ways. First, individuals who have received benefits prior to the reform may lose benefits altogether as a result of the reforms. Second, individuals who were not receiving benefits, due to a host of reasons (possibly related to austerity), may start receiving benefits from a now less-generous welfare state. Third, individuals who had already and continuously received the same benefit prior to a reforms could see a reduction in the value or quality of the benefit. The main challenge is to distinguish those selections in (or out of) benefits as a result of the reforms vis-à-vis those whose personal situation changes for reasons unrelated to the welfare cuts.

B. Zooming In on Individual Benefit Reforms

I next discuss three welfare reforms affecting roughly 10 percent of all UK households, for which I can tackle selection concerns rather well.

Council Tax Benefit Abolishment (CTB).—Council tax is a tax levied by local councils to pay for some public goods (e.g., waste collection). Up until April 2013, people earning low incomes could be exempted from paying council tax, or they could receive a rebate. The central government financed this benefit, but it was canceled without replacement starting with the new fiscal year in 2013. As a result, an estimated 2.4 million households across the United Kingdom were asked to pay the full council tax for the first time starting in April 2013. The extent of council tax varies across the UK from council to council, but is usually at least around £1,000 annually per household.
I identify the population of individual households affected by this reform based on whether they consistently received council tax benefit at all the times they were surveyed prior to April 2013. This set of individuals was most likely affected by the abolishment of the council tax benefit and it is unlikely that results are conflated by endogenous selection.

For the estimating equation to be explored in detail further below, I define a subset of treated individuals as:

\[
T_{i,CTB} = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if received council tax benefit prior to April 2013} \\
0 & \text{else}
\end{cases}
\]

In addition, the USOC survey instrument consistently asked respondents whether they were “behind with their council tax payments,” allowing me to provide evidence on a direct reform impact margin.

Disability Living Allowance (DLA).—Established in 1992, the Disability Living Allowance (DLA) was a social security benefit paid to disabled individuals aged under 65 to help cover the cost of a personal care and/or mobility need due to a disability. It was a tax-free, non-means-tested and non-contributory benefit with an estimated 3.2 million claimants across the United Kingdom by 2012. The Welfare Reform Act of 2012 led to the replacement of DLA with a new system of benefits called Personal Independence Payments (PIP). PIP could be claimed by working-age claimants, and continues to be non-means-tested; but involves regular work-capability assessments carried out by private contractors on behalf of the government.

The transfer to the new system caused significant public outcry. While only a relatively small share of DLA claimants lost their benefit following the reassessment, a change in the quality or conditionality of awards (by requiring regular work capability checks, for example) affected a nonnegligible share of the 73 percent of recipients transitioned to PIP.26 The PIP rollout started October 28, 2013 and existing beneficiaries from DLA were gradually converted to PIP. Unfortunately, I do not know when individuals were converted from DLA to PIP, because these two benefits are lumped together in the benefit-receipt data.

To tackle selection, I focus on the subset of claimants who had a so-called indefinite award of DLA and, prior to the introduction of PIP, were not required to regularly reapply for the benefit. I code these lifetime recipients as treated from 2013:IV , when the rollout of PIP started. For the empirical design, this set of affected individuals is identified as follows:

\[
T_{i,DLA} = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if always received either DLA or PIP} \\
0 & \text{else}
\end{cases}
\]

Technically, all DLA recipients with a lifetime award should receive a similar monetary award through PIP. Nonetheless, the process and the requirement for assessment are said to have caused significant grievances.\(^{27}\)

**Bedroom Tax (BTX).**—Housing benefit is a benefit paid to individuals on low income living in social housing, as government-subsidized rental properties are called in the United Kingdom. As of April 2013, all current and future working-age tenants renting from a local authority, housing association, or other registered “social landlord” ceased to receive help that had previously been available to defray the costs of a spare room. This provision was also dubbed the bedroom tax in the popular press as it implied that a lot of working-age parents, whose children had moved out, found themselves living in accommodation with a spare bedroom. The rules allow one bedroom for each adult couple, for each single person over 16, for each two children of the same sex under 16 and for each two children of either sex under 10. Significant cuts were imposed on housing benefit for individual recipients who were found to have a spare room as per these definitions; financial support to pay rent fell by 14 percent for those found to have one spare bedroom, and by 25 percent for those found to have two or more.

I identify individuals who were most likely affected by the bedroom tax as follows. They must continuously live in social housing (roughly 16.4 percent of the sample) and, they must have a spare bedroom as per the government’s definition at the most recent time they were surveyed before April 2013.\(^{28}\) This defines a simple treatment indicator used in the various difference-in-differences estimations:

\[
T_{i,BTX} = \begin{cases} 
1 & \text{if lives in social housing with excess bedroom(s) prior April 2013} \\
0 & \text{else.}
\end{cases}
\]

The bedroom tax was widely debated and affected more than 660,000 households across the country. To avoid financial losses, the government encouraged households to “move to accommodation which better reflects the size and composition of their household.”\(^{29}\) I can directly measure two impact margins relevant to this benefit cut: the number of bedrooms in the respondent’s accommodation after April 2013, and further, whether individuals report to be “behind with their rent.”

**Combined Treatment.**—In addition to using these three groups to define exposure to treatment \(T_{i,j}\) with \(j \in \{\text{CTB, DLA, BTX}\}\), I also construct a combined dummy \(T_{i,\text{ANY}}\) that takes on a value of 1 if a respondent household belongs to either of these groups. In total, 10 percent of my USOC sample are affected by either of

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\(^{27}\) Anecdotes that generated outrage proliferated in the media. For example, articles reported that wheelchair-bound claimants were asked to attend reassessment appointments in non-accessible facilities, and claimants with trisomy 21 (Down syndrome) were asked when they “caught it.” Further, there were concerns about the qualification of the staff of two private firms tasked with conducting the reassessments. The Independent, “Disability Benefit Assessors Failing to Meet Government’s Quality Standards,” https://goo.gl/ux4yD5, accessed June 23, 2018.

\(^{28}\) The requirement of living continuously in social housing is conservative as some households attempting to avoid the bedroom tax may have moved to the private rented sector in anticipation. The spare bedroom indicator is constructed using the information on the household composition and the age distribution of children allowing a near replication of the government’s criteria.

these three treatments, which is similar compared to the aggregate estimate from Beatty and Fothergill (2013), suggesting that between 2 million to 3 million households (around 10 percent of households) were affected by these three measures. I next discuss the empirical strategy.

C. Empirical Strategy

As before, I present results from pooled difference-in-differences designs as well as event studies.

Pooled Difference-in-Differences.—I begin by estimating simple pooled difference-in-differences, across a range of specifications that include different sets of fixed effects. The least demanding specification will be the equivalent to the specifications estimated in the previous sections, controlling for district- and region-specific nonlinear time effects, but now exploiting individual-level data. The most demanding specification, with \( i \) indexing an individual, takes the following form:

\[
y_{i,d,w,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_{d,w,t} + \gamma \times \text{Post}_{i,j,t} \times T_{i,j} + \epsilon_{i,d,w,t}.
\]

The inclusion of individual-level fixed effects \( \alpha_i \) implies that I exploit only within-individual variation. The time fixed effects, \( \beta_{d,w,t} \), are very demanding because they are specific to each of the 379 districts. They thus absorb any district-specific time-varying shocks affecting outcomes of respondents living in the same districts in a common fashion. This amounts to estimating more than 12,000 coefficients.\(^{30}\) Importantly, these district-specific time effects also quite richly control for the indirect exposure to austerity that the analysis of the local multipliers suggested.

The main coefficient of interest is \( \gamma \), which captures changes in the outcome variables \( y_{i,d,w,t} \) after, indicated by \( \text{Post}_{i,j,t} \), a benefit cut \( j \) became effective for the subpopulation indicated by \( T_{i,j} \). The main outcome variable studied \( y_{i,d,w,t} \) is a dummy variable indicating whether respondents reveal a preference toward UKIP. In addition, I study a range of reform-specific auxiliary outcome measures that are either immediately relevant to the welfare cuts, or capture political perceptions more broadly.

Event Studies.—I also estimate a range of event studies for the specific benefit cuts, using less demanding specifications, but fully exploiting the frequency of the survey data that arises due to the staggered data collection for the USOC waves.

The estimation specification is as follows:

\[
y_{i,d,r,w,t} = \alpha_d + \beta_{r,w,t} + \sum_{t=2010:1}^{2015:IV} \gamma_t \times \text{Time}_t \times T_{i,j} + \epsilon_{i,r,w,t}.
\]

\(^{30}\)Such shocks could be austerity-caused closures of libraries or parks. The fixed effects are also specific to each survey-wave to control for survey-specific idiosyncrasies.
This specification is almost identical to the specification studied when using aggregate data with two differences. The time fixed effects $\beta_{r,w,t}$ are resolved at the quarter level specific to the survey wave $w$ and region $r$. I estimate a full set of quarter time effects $\gamma_t$, to draw event study plots showing how the outcome variables $y_{i,d,r,w,t}$ evolved over time relative to the timing specific to a reform $j$.

D. Results

I first discuss the results from the pooled difference-in-differences exercise, before turning to the event studies.

**Pooled Difference-in-Differences.**—The pooled difference-in-differences results are presented in Table 2. The dependent variable in this table is a dummy indicating an individual expressed support for UKIP. Columns 2–4 provide estimates for the three different welfare reforms affecting different subpopulations, while column 1 combines these into a single treatment indicator that is switched on from April 2013. Panels A through C employ different sets of fixed effects for the estimation. Panel A controls for district and region by survey-wave by time fixed effects.
effects. This empirical design comes closest to the estimations conducted in the previous sections by exploiting district-level variation. Across the different welfare reforms, the population likely exposed to a reform is significantly more likely to express support for UKIP after these reforms became effective. The point estimates are economically sizable and precisely estimated, indicating that the treated population sees an increase in the propensity to support UKIP by between 2.6–5.1 percentage points. In relative terms, the propensity to support UKIP increases by between 53 percent and 108 percent (relative to the mean of the dependent variable, which stands at 4.7 percent). While the mean of the dependent variable appears low, suggesting that the effects are driven by a small subpopulation, it should be seen relative to levels of support for other political parties. The Liberal Democrats, the United Kingdom’s other main party, sees support in the USOC population averaging at just 8.2 percent; hence, the UKIP figures are not dramatically lower. In the next section, I explore a set of further outcomes to allay concerns about the validity of the outcome measure.

Panel B only exploits within-district variation, controlling for district by survey wave by time fixed effects. This effectively controls for any idiosyncratic and time-varying shocks affecting all residents in a specific district. Such common shocks could, e.g., be capturing the indirect economic effects of austerity affecting the wider local economy or other local shocks. Throughout, the results remain very similar across the different measures.

In panel C finally, I only exploit within-individual variation within districts, controlling for individual-level fixed effects in addition to the district- and survey-specific time fixed effects. Though this comes at the cost of losing some statistical power, the results remain precisely estimated.

**Event Studies.**—I next turn to the event studies for the council tax benefit and the bedroom tax. Panel A presents the average support for UKIP among those individuals who have consistently received council tax benefit at all times prior to its abolishment. The vertical line marks the date from which the council tax benefit was abolished. The propensity to support UKIP is consistently higher, on average, after the benefit was abolished which most likely affected this subpopulation. Panel B highlights that this subpopulation is indeed affected by the benefit cut; the share of individuals in the treated subpopulation stating that they are behind with their council tax payments rises sharply and in a very timely fashion. In online Appendix Figure A5, I further highlight how, for this population, a marked and timely significant drop occurs in benefit income and gross income, while labor income remains unaffected.

Next, I turn to study the effects of the bedroom tax, which affected households on low incomes living in social housing. The results are presented in Panel A of Figure 7. The subpopulation that most likely was exposed to the reform sees a timely increase in support for UKIP. While the DLA-to-PIP conversion did not generate direct economic grievances, in particular for this subpopulation of lifetime DLA claimants, among this set of respondents there is a significantly higher increase in perception that “government officials do not care,” which in turn, is also strongly linked to support UKIP and Leave (see online Appendix Tables A10 and A11).
presents the effects on support for UKIP among the group of individuals affected by the bedroom tax. While the pattern is noisier, there is a consistent increase in support for UKIP among this subpopulation. Panel B explores an economic margin directly relevant to those individuals who, likely, saw a cut to their housing benefit payment: they are significantly more likely to be in arrears with their rent, suggesting that the cut to housing benefit due to the spare bedroom increased rent arrears. Lastly, panel C studies the number of bedrooms as an outcome variable, which is immediately relevant as the bedroom tax could be avoided if households moved to smaller accommodation. The pattern is quite consistent, suggesting that households started to move to smaller accommodation; while moving costs may not be negligible, this suggests that some households may have been able to avoid some of the direct economic grievances.

Together, these results provide further evidence in support of the underlying common trends assumption inherent to the previously presented difference-in-differences estimates. I next discuss a few additional robustness checks before studying broader measures of political dissatisfaction.

**Accounting for Other Shocks.**—While the event studies suggest that there are no diverging pre-trends, some concerns may remain that the observed effects on support for UKIP (and the auxiliary outcomes explored in the next section) could be masking other unobserved and concurrent shocks. A host of these concerns can be addressed by saturating the main estimation model with additional controls as is done in online Appendix Table A5, where column 1 replicates the corresponding column 1 in Table 2 for reference. Columns 2–4 explore the implications of controlling for region-by-qualification-group or region-by-economic-activity status-specific time effects. The former accounts for unobservable region and skill-group specific

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**Figure 6. Impact of Abolishment of National Council Tax Benefit System Effective April 2013 on Support for UKIP and Being Behind on Council Tax Payments**

Notes: Figure plots event studies studying the impact of the abolishment of council tax benefit on previous recipients. The dependent variable in panel A is a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent revealed a political preference in support of UKIP. The dependent panel in the right-hand side is an indicator variable indicating whether the respondent is behind with his or her council tax payments. The regressions control for council by survey wave by time fixed effects. The graph plots point estimates of the interaction between an indicator variable indicating whether the individual respondents received council tax benefit at each point in time in the three years prior to the reform in which they were observed in the sample interacted with an indicator for the survey quarter. Standard errors are clustered at the district level with 90 percent confidence bands indicated.
(labor market) shocks, while the latter accounts for the potential exposure to multiple concurrent policy shocks. (The economic activity status distinguishes between 11 different categories, such as being employed, retired, self-employed, a student, in a family care role, or being unemployed.)

Columns 5 and 6 further aim to account for a potentially (long-delayed) political response to the 2009 Recession. To address this issue, I construct an identifier for each distinct economic activity status sequence that appears in the whole USOC panel. I then allow each such unique group that is identified by a distinct economic activity status history to have a different set of time effects. \[32\] This adds

\[32\] This would allow a separate nonlinear time trend in political attitudes for certain cohorts. For example, this would separate groups of individuals who were unemployed throughout the period of study from those who were, say, unemployed in 2009 and then become and remained employed again from 2010 onward.

**Figure 7. Impact of Bedroom Tax Effective April 2013**

*Notes:* Figure plots event studies studying the impact of the bedroom tax penalizing households receiving housing benefit living in social housing and who are judged to have a spare bedroom. The dependent variable in panel A is a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent revealed a political preference in support of UKIP. The dependent variable in panel B is an indicator whether respondents state that they are in arrears with their rent, while the outcome variable in panel C is the number of bedrooms in the dwelling in which a respondent lives. The regressions control for council by survey wave by time fixed effects. The graph plots point estimates of the interaction between an indicator variable indicating whether the individual respondents are living in social housing at each point in time observed in the data and are judged to have an extra bedroom at the most recent time they were surveyed relative to the reform becoming effective in April 2013. Standard errors are clustered at the district level with 90 percent confidence bands indicated.
to the estimation a further 18,000 unique estimable controls in the most demanding specification and renders many observations perfectly collinear. Yet, the observation that exposure to either of the three reforms increases the propensity to support for UKIP remains broadly intact.

Refinement of the Control Group.—A second refinement of the analysis may consist of restricting the control group. Naturally, this will have implications for the statistical power especially when estimating the more saturated models. I consider two such refinements. First, an ad hoc refinement that restricts the control group to those who at some point in time have received the respective benefit or could have received it. An alternative approach to refine the control group uses propensity-score matching to construct matched pairs. For each reform, I construct matched pairs, with the matching based on: gender, age, dummy variables for the different economic-activity status, the housing-tenure status indicators, a set of features capturing the educational attainment across the five categories included in the UK census, along with the log value of pre-treatment monthly benefit income. This variable implies that matching will compare individuals with similar amounts of benefit income that differ only with respect to the specific benefit that is undergoing reform and is the subject of study. I impose a caliper of 0.01 to focus on good matches based on the baseline observables.

The results from this exercise are added as online Appendix Table A6, replicating the main results of Table 2, but adding the estimates that are obtained restricting the control groups. The analysis highlights that the results are robust. Unsurprisingly, statistical power is lost when moving from the less demanding specifications to the most demanding specifications, which absorb both individual-level and demanding district-level time effects, especially for the Disability Living Allowance reform and the bedroom tax. This loss of power is not a substantive concern as, for example, the specification on the matched panel in column 5 of panel C, in excess of 18,000 parameters are estimated on a sample of just over 60,000 observations.

E. Broader Outcome Measures

Expressing political support for UKIP may only be one specific outcome measure, but the political responses to austerity could be broader.

Support and Like or Dislike for Other Parties.—I first present results capturing shifts in expressions of support for other political parties. These are presented in Table 3. Overall, the results suggest that UKIP was a much stronger beneficiary of the support lost by the Conservatives (see panel A) than other parties, such as Labour, which also were also not in government. Support for Labour and the Liberal Democrats increases weakly among those affected by either of the three welfare reforms. There is also a weak reduction in those reporting that they would not vote for any party if there was an election tomorrow in panel D. This would be indicative of a potential increase in turnout that has been suggested to be an important factor in driving populist support (see Guiso, Morelli, and Sonno 2018). The analysis presented in online Appendix Table A7 suggests that those who become UKIP supporters are mostly original supporters of the Conservatives, Labour, and a few
other parties but only marginally from among those who initially reported that they support no party / would not vote. The welfare-reform induced gains for Labour are mostly drawn from this pool of people.

In online Appendix Table A8, I present results drawing on measures of the intensity of like or dislike of the three historic main political parties (the Conservatives, Labour, and the Liberal Democrats) on a 10-point Likert scale. The results suggest that respondents affected by the combined any welfare reform measure are much more likely to express a scores indicating strong dislike for the Conservative party.

Perception of Politics More Broadly.—In Table 4, I present evidence for three additional survey questions, asking whether individuals perceive that “Public officials do not care,” that they “Don’t have a say in what government does” and that “Your vote is unlikely to make a difference.” Each of these auxiliary measures see a significant increase among individuals exposed to welfare reforms. Online Appendix Table A9 further highlights that the effects of exposure to welfare reforms on these auxiliary outcomes go beyond what can be accounted for by an individuals’ political

| Table 3—The Impact of Different Austerity Measures on Support for Other Parties: Exploiting Individual-Level Data |
|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|
| | Any | CTB | DLA | BTX |
| | Post × benefit cut | Post × benefit cut | Post × benefit cut | Post × benefit cut |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Panel A. Support for Conservatives | | | | |
| Post × benefit cut | −0.023 | −0.019 | −0.022 | −0.027 |
| Mean of dependent variable | 0.259 | 0.259 | 0.259 | 0.261 |
| Local authority districts | 379 | 379 | 379 | 379 |
| Observations | 252,642 | 252,642 | 252,642 | 245,352 |
| Panel B. Support for Labour | | | | |
| Post × benefit cut | 0.014 | 0.017 | −0.004 | 0.011 |
| Mean of dependent variable | 0.351 | 0.351 | 0.351 | 0.348 |
| Local authority districts | 379 | 379 | 379 | 379 |
| Observations | 252,642 | 252,642 | 252,642 | 245,352 |
| Panel C. Support for Liberal Democrats | | | | |
| Post × benefit cut | 0.008 | 0.004 | −0.003 | 0.013 |
| Mean of dependent variable | 0.0815 | 0.0815 | 0.0815 | 0.0828 |
| Local authority districts | 379 | 379 | 379 | 379 |
| Observations | 252,642 | 252,642 | 252,642 | 245,352 |
| Panel D. Support for no party | | | | |
| Post × benefit cut | −0.010 | −0.015 | 0.009 | −0.006 |
| Mean of dependent variable | 0.193 | 0.193 | 0.193 | 0.193 |
| Local authority districts | 379 | 379 | 379 | 379 |
| Observations | 252,642 | 252,642 | 252,642 | 245,352 |
| Individual fixed effects | X | X | X | X |
| District × wave × time fixed effects | X | X | X | X |

Notes: Table reports results from a panel OLS regressions. The dependent variable is a dummy indicating individual USOC respondent’s support for the Conservatives (panel A), the Labour party (panel B), and the Liberal Democratic party (panel C). The regressions include various different levels of fixed effects indicated at the bottom of the table. Standard errors clustered at the Local Government Authority District Level are presented in parentheses.
preferences. As we will see, these auxiliary outcomes are also correlates for Leave support, even after accounting for an individuals’ political party preference.\footnote{Online Appendix Table A10 further highlights that the effects on these auxiliary outcomes are broadly carried across the three distinct reforms studied.}

The perception of having no political voice is something that was prominently leveraged in the EU referendum campaign, with voters being suggested that voting against EU membership is a vote against the status quo (Ford and Goodwin 2017). The observed additional effects are consistent with the idea that austerity contributed to a feeling of disenfranchisement or disconnect from the established political parties and institutions, and encouraged voters to support more extreme policy positions or engage in protest voting (Myatt 2017). Unfortunately, despite the interesting observation of a weak increase in turnout intentions among the affected population, as I do not observe actual turnout for the 2016 EU referendum to let this observation bear on the data. Nevertheless, as I will show in the next section, exposure to welfare reforms, as per the definitions above, not only increased propensity to support UKIP and increased perceived marginalization, but is, further, strongly linked to expressions of support for Leave.

Table 4—Wider Measures of Perceptions of Disenfranchisement and Turnout: Included Only in Some Waves of the USOC Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel A. Public officials don’t care</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post \times benefit cut</td>
<td>0.078</td>
<td>0.073</td>
<td>0.051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean of dependent variable</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>3.37</td>
<td>3.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local authority districts</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>75,547</td>
<td>75,547</td>
<td>75,547</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel B. Don’t have say in what government does</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post \times benefit cut</td>
<td>0.096</td>
<td>0.093</td>
<td>0.068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean of dependent variable</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>3.34</td>
<td>3.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local authority districts</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>75,897</td>
<td>75,897</td>
<td>75,897</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel C. Your vote is unlikely to make a difference</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
<th>(3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Post \times benefit cut</td>
<td>0.020</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean of dependent variable</td>
<td>0.563</td>
<td>0.563</td>
<td>0.563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local authority districts</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>378</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>74,947</td>
<td>74,947</td>
<td>74,947</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Table reports results from a panel OLS regressions. The dependent variable in panels A and B is a score on a 5-point likert scale (strongly disagree–strongly agree). In panel C it is a dummy variable equal to 1 if respondents indicate that they think it is unlikely that their vote makes a difference. Standard errors clustered at the Local Government Authority District Level are presented in parentheses.
F. Welfare Reform Exposure and Support for Leave

The most recent USOC survey wave asked the EU referendum question in which 43 percent expressed support for Leave. Not surprisingly, UKIP supporters stand out with 87 percent supporting Leave as suggested by online Appendix Figure A7. I next study the impact of welfare reforms on support for UKIP and Leave jointly.

Empirical Approach.—I set up a two-equation system to study whether exposure to welfare reforms and support for UKIP and Leave in 2016 can be linked. To do so, I construct for each individual $i$, a measure of whether an individual “switched to UKIP” before or after a reform $j$ became effective. This implies collapsing the data from an unbalanced panel used in the main difference-in-differences specification (3) into a two-period panel.\footnote{Collapsing the data into a two-period panel has the added benefit of being a common ad hoc approach to solve the inference problems in contexts with serial correlation highlighted in DiD settings by Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004).} The two-period panel can then simply be first-differenced to obtain an individual-level cross section:

\[
\Delta_{UKIP,i,d} = \beta_d + \gamma_j \times T_{i,j} + \nu_{i,d}.
\]

The first-differencing implies that time-invariant individual-level characteristics are accounted for.

A second equation studies support for Leave in the cross section and would constitute the second equation in the system:

\[
\text{Leave}_{i,d} = \xi_d + X_i' \beta + \phi_j \times T_{i,j} + \epsilon_{i,d}.
\]

Conceivably, the vector of additional controls $X_i$ should include a set of factors that would be captured by the individual-level fixed effects implicit in the first-difference estimator. As an ad hoc approach, I saturate equation (6) with a consecutively more demanding vector of controls.

The system consisting of equations (5) and (6) can then be estimated using a seemingly unrelated regression, which accounts for a potential cross-correlation between $\epsilon_{i,d}$ and $\nu_{i,d}$ and allows me to test whether $\phi = \gamma$. This null hypothesis is expected to be rejected against the alternative of $\gamma < \phi$ as the previous sections suggested that the welfare reforms were affecting factors contributing to Leave sentiment beyond what is captured by UKIP.

Results.—The results are presented in Table 5. Moving across the columns, iteratively more demanding sets of control variables are added. Column 1 only include district fixed effects. In column 2, I add qualification group and age fixed effects. Column 3 adds economic activity status group effects (such as being employed, unemployed, a full-time student, retired ...). Column 4 adds gross-household-income-decile fixed effects. Column 5 controls for a set of dummy variables capturing whether individuals reported any of 17 different health conditions. Column 6 focuses on the subset of individuals in employment controlling for socioeconomic
status and sector of employment. The results suggest that the estimated propensity to support Leave is at least 6.8 percentage points higher among individuals exposed to either of the three welfare reforms. Throughout, the null hypothesis of $\phi = \gamma$ is rejected against the alternative of $\gamma < \phi$. This is not surprising, as online Appendix Table A11 shows that the additional outcomes explored in Table 4 and the event studies are also strong correlates of Leave over and above what can be accounted for by controlling for the expressed political preferences. Support for UKIP thus likely understates the extent to which exposure to the welfare reforms contributed to the build-up of Leave sentiment, which is consistent with the observation in Section III.35

G. Welfare Cuts in the Broader Economic Context

The analysis above suggests that austerity and the implied welfare reforms are important to understanding the changes in the United Kingdom’s political landscape in the run up to the EU referendum. Yet, the underlying economic reasons for why individuals become exposed to welfare reforms (by virtue of becoming reliant on the welfare state) are much broader. To shed some more light on this and to connect with the broader literature, I study how income from benefits and labor have evolved over a longer period, with a focus on the human-capital divide.

35 Online Appendix Table A12 further highlights that the results are robust to focusing on the sample of matched pairs.
Estimating Robust Trends.—To do so, I combine data from the USOC study from 2009 with its much smaller precursor, the British Household Panel study (BHPS), to study an individual-level panel from 2001. I estimate the following specification:

\[
y_{i,d,r,w,t} = \alpha_i + \beta_{d,w,t} + \sum_{t=2001}^{2015} \gamma_t \times \text{Time}_t \times X_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,r,w,t}.
\]

Here, the dependent variable \(y_{i,d,r,w,t}\) measures individual \(i\)'s monthly labor income, benefits income, and gross income over time. The specification controls for individual respondent fixed effects \(\alpha_i\), while also controlling for district by survey wave and year fixed effects. The coefficients of interests are the point estimates on \(\gamma_t\), capturing the extent to which an individual \(i\)'s educational attainment \(X_{i,t}\) correlates with the evolution of incomes over time.

Results.—The results are visually presented in Figure 8. Panel A presents the trends for respondents with no formal qualifications. The figures suggest that throughout the last 15 years, monthly labor incomes for this group of individuals have, in relative terms, declined. The central figure presents the evolution of monthly benefit income, which has stayed flat for the early years in the 2000s, but started expanding in 2005. This suggests that, at least in part, the relative secular...
decline in labor incomes was cushioned by an expansion of benefit payments to individuals with low human capital. This trend in benefit growth came to an abrupt halt in 2011 as austerity took effect. The last column presents gross income, which includes income from both labor and benefits. For most of the early 2000s gross income for individuals with low educational attainment declines in relative terms, yet, as benefit income expands, this trend flattens out. As austerity started to take effect, in 2014, marked relative declines in gross income occur.

Panel B studies the trends pertaining to respondents who have completed at least an undergraduate university degree. Labor income for this group of individuals has trended up significantly over time in an uninterrupted fashion; the same is true for gross income, shown in the right column. Not surprisingly, benefit income for this group contracts mostly throughout the 15 years.

**Discussion.**—There are three main observations. First, labor income for individuals at the lower end of the skill divide declined significantly over time, while labor income for those at the top end of the human capital divide increased markedly in relative terms. This is consistent with the literature documenting growing labor market polarization (Card and DiNardo 2002; Lemieux 2006; Goos, Manning, and Salomons 2014). Second, though the welfare state had been responsive, evening out these growing inequalities for those with low skills, this growth in benefit incomes came to an abrupt halt as the Conservative-led coalition government’s austerity measures took effect. As this paper demonstrates, these measures significantly contributed to the build-up of Leave sentiment (even after controlling for region- and skill-group-specific labor market shocks). Third, gross income inequality across the skills divide is likely to have increased substantially since 2010 due to austerity.

The observations are relevant in the context of the existing research studying the causal drivers behind the rise in populism. A lot of work has focused on the role of trade-induced manufacturing sector decline (see Autor et al. 2016; Colantone and Stanig 2018; Dippel, Gold, and Heblich 2015). Yet, this can only account for a part of the story, at least in the context of the United Kingdom. In online Appendix Figure A8, I show that the patterns presented in Figure 8 are robust to excluding individuals who have ever worked in manufacturing, agriculture, or mining. Since these sectors are most vulnerable to economic pressures due to trade, the fact that the overall trends in income (from labor and benefits) and gross incomes along the human-capital divide remain intact suggests that the secular decline in labor incomes for those with low human capital cannot be explained by trade integration alone. Other factors beyond trade integration that are likely to feature among additional explanations of the trends documented here are: structural transformation (Rogerson 2008, Rodrik 2016), the rise of automation (Caprettini and Voth 2015, Graetz and Michaels 2018), skill-biased technological change more broadly (Acemoglu 1998; Autor, Levy, and Murnane 2003), the rise of the gig economy, or, possibly, some forms of migration (Becker and Fetzer 2018; Dustmann, Frattini, and Preston 2013).

Importantly, the results suggest that an *active welfare state* can help mitigate the growing skill bias in labor markets (to which trade integration has likely contributed). In the context of the United Kingdom, the results suggest that cuts to the welfare state since 2010 likely activated already existing grievances and resentment.
V. Conclusion

The United Kingdom’s 2016 vote to leave the European Union is a watershed moment. It marks an end to a 70-year-long process of continued economic and political integration in Europe. Understanding the causes for why the United Kingdom’s electorate voted to leave the European Union is of utmost importance, not only for the United Kingdom as it redefines its relationship with Europe, but for many other European countries that see a growth in support for political parties campaigning on anti-EU political platforms.

This paper presents evidence suggesting that austerity policies from late 2010 onward are key to understanding Brexit. The welfare reforms are a strong driving factor behind the growing support for the populist UKIP party in the wake of the EU referendum, contributed to the development of broader anti-establishment preferences, and are strongly associated with higher levels of support for Leave. The results suggest that the EU referendum either may not have taken place, or, as back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest, could have resulted in a victory for Remain, had it not been for austerity.

While exposure to austerity-induced welfare reforms is a key activating factor contributing to the build-up of Leave sentiment, and to support for populist parties, the underlying economic causes of the growing reliance and exposure of (especially low-skilled) individuals on the welfare state are of key relevance to the broader public and political debate. This paper provides some suggestive auxiliary evidence indicating that factors contributing to the growing skill-divide in labor markets are likely to go beyond trade-integration alone, which is a key driver explored in an important growing literature.

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