

Security Transitions[†]

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How do foreign powers disengage from a conflict? We study this issue by examining the recent, large-scale security transition from international troops to local forces in the ongoing civil conflict in Afghanistan. We construct a new dataset that combines information on this transition process with declassified conflict outcomes and previously unreleased quarterly survey data of residents' perceptions of local security. Our empirical design leverages the staggered roll-out of the transition, and employs a novel instrumental variables approach to estimate the impact. We find a significant, sharp, and timely decline of insurgent violence in the initial phase: the security transfer to Afghan forces. We find that this is followed by a significant surge in violence in the second phase: the actual physical withdrawal of foreign troops. We argue that this pattern is consistent with a signaling model, in which the insurgents reduce violence strategically to facilitate the foreign military withdrawal to capitalize on the reduced foreign military presence afterward. Our findings clarify the destabilizing consequences of withdrawal in one of the costliest conflicts in modern history, and yield potentially actionable insights for designing future security transitions. (JEL D74, F51, F52, O17)

Foreign military occupations typically end with a security transition, in which international forces transfer military and police powers to local allies. Such foreign-to-local security transitions are difficult to manage (Lake 2016). This is due to the likely survival, in one form or another, of anti-government elements that triggered the foreign military intervention. The matter of who gains or loses power at the end of the eventual security transition may have significant short- and long-run

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[†]Go to <https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20200412> to visit the article page for additional materials and author disclosure statements.

consequences for economic and political development. Yet, surprisingly little is known about the conflict dynamics of countries experiencing a foreign-to-local security transition. Our research addresses this issue by conducting a microlevel study of the impact of the large-scale security transition that marked the end of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, the long-running military campaign of the North American Treaty Organization (NATO).

Since 1960, at least 115 foreign military occupations have ended (Collard-Wexler 2013) (see online Appendix Figure A1). A substantial percentage of these interventions involved a security transition with the withdrawal of troops and redeployment of weaponry to local allies. With a large number of military occupations active around the world, security transitions are an important economic and policy issue. Even though the historical record is riddled with security transitions, nearly all microlevel empirical research on counterinsurgency focuses on understanding the economic and political drivers that explain how military interventions *begin*, and how conflict strategies and war fighting tactics evolve *during* an ongoing campaign (Berman and Matanock 2015). By contrast, the security transitions that mark the *end* of foreign military occupations have received less attention. Empirical work on this topic has naturally been constrained by the lack of consistent conflict data during the transition period, particularly for unsuccessful transitions. Our paper overcomes this long-standing constraint by leveraging unique, rich microlevel data collected continuously during the transition process in Afghanistan; these data enable us to address the knowledge gap around exit strategies after foreign interventions.

Conflict patterns during and after the security transitions that mark the end of a foreign intervention or occupation are theoretically ambiguous. A security transition may shift provision of policing and formal military operations from well-trained and equipped foreign fighters to unseasoned, local forces armed with outdated technologies, or equipment with which they are unfamiliar. Even if local fighters are capable, they may lack legitimacy, inflict unintended harm on civilians, or deliberately discriminate against ethnic rivals: undermining economic welfare and damaging public confidence in the quality and stability of host-nation institutions. Local forces might also transfer weaponry and other war fighting capital to unregulated paramilitary groups (Dube and Naidu 2015). Under these conditions, insurgents are likely to increase their operations, and they may consolidate their control over previously contested areas. Furthermore, insurgents may directly and strategically respond to plans of foreign forces to withdraw troops by changing their underlying tactics and targets (Bueno de Mesquita 2013, Wright 2016, Vanden Eynde 2018). Security transitions may be poorly coordinated between foreign and local forces, leading to political and tactical disorder, and further enhancing tensions. On the other hand, local forces might be better able to integrate with communities and to extract information from noncombatants about insurgent operations (Lyall, Shiraito, and Imai 2015). Local forces may have greater knowledge than foreign soldiers about the human terrain and difficulties motivating violence against conationals or coethnics; this understanding could lead to reduced insurgent activity and increased counterinsurgent effectiveness. Importantly, there is no existing empirical evidence on the relative significance of these different mechanisms in the context of security transitions.

To study how security transitions from foreign to local forces influence insurgent activity and counterinsurgent effectiveness, we examine the large-scale transfer of policing and military power from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to host nation forces in Afghanistan at the end of Operation Enduring Freedom. In 2001, international forces displaced the incumbent regime, and assisted in the installation of an ostensibly democratic government. During the occupation foreign forces, coordinated under the auspices of NATO, helped train and equip local police and military forces. Planning for the transition of security provision from ISAF to Afghan forces began as early as 2010, and was formally announced in 2011. The transition was staggered, and coordinated around administrative districts. Over three years, and five transition tranches, Afghanistan's districts were transferred from ISAF to Afghan control.

We estimate the impact of the security transition on conflict dynamics using exceptionally granular data, which allow us to overcome a core constraint that has hampered quantitative studies of security transitions so far. Since the start of major ISAF operations, a system to collect comprehensive conflict data from ISAF and host-nation forces was set up to track significant activities (SIGACTS). These geo-tagged and time-stamped event data document dozens of different types of insurgent and security force operations: representing the most complete catalog of conflict activity during Operation Enduring Freedom currently available (Shaver and Wright 2016). We secured access to these data through formal declassification channels. We then combined these observational data with microlevel survey data collected by NATO (using local contractors) through the Afghanistan National Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR) platform. We obtained restricted access to the complete survey records of around 370,000 individual respondents across dozens of quarterly waves from 2008 to 2016. These surveys include questions measuring perceptions of security conditions, the extent of local security provision, and perceptions of territorial control. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first conflict where detailed combat records and high frequency survey data can be combined to study a security transition from foreign to local forces. Using these data in tandem allows us to cross-validate our findings and to distinguish between potential mechanisms.¹

Our empirical analysis sheds light on the two main phases of the security transition. The first phase is the onset of the transition, marked by a sequence of public announcements detailing where and when security responsibility is to be handed over to local forces. The second phase is the actual physical withdrawal and closure of military bases hosting NATO troops. To estimate the effect of the onset of the security transition, we use a difference-in-differences approach. We exploit the staggered schedule of transition announcements that occurred across five tranches. This allows us to pool evidence from each of the tranches to study the onset and aftermath of the security transition on conflict outcomes by comparing localities where the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) took over security to those where ISAF was still in charge. We examine security levels in districts before and after the security transfer. The geographic precision of our conflict data enables us to employ a high-resolution, spatial-matching

¹Existing work rarely combines observational and survey data on conflicts; Gould and Klor (2010) and Jaeger et al. (2015) are notable exceptions. Studying both observational data on conflict events and survey data on security perceptions side by side, we find consistent patterns across both types of data.

design as an alternative to our district-level analysis. Our results for this first transfer phase show that the local announcement of the security transition schedule led to a short-term decline in local violence. This pattern holds both for conflict measures that are drawn from the SIGACTS database as well for those that are taken from ANQAR survey instruments measuring the security perceptions of the local population. This improvement in security outcomes appears to have gone hand in hand with a substantial upward shift in civilian perceptions of the efficacy of local security forces.

Our second empirical exercise focuses on the physical withdrawal of NATO troops. Using a newly constructed dataset of individual base closures and handovers, we employ an instrumental variables strategy, exploiting operational and logistical constraints of the troop withdrawal. Specifically, we exploit cross-sectional variation in the travel distance between individual districts and the ten major logistical hubs that had the military-grade airports required to accommodate the cargo airplanes that transported arms and troops out of the country. This approach helps us to address concerns about the endogeneity of the sequencing of base closures across different regions. We address potential violations of the exclusion restriction directly by accounting for the correlation between logistical constraints and other measures of population and market proximity. Our findings for this second phase show that violence significantly surged, and residents' perceptions of security plummeted after the departure of international forces. Overall, the pattern that emerges suggests that the security handover is associated with an improvement in the security situation, while the physical withdrawal of NATO troops is marked by a dramatic worsening of security.

This pattern is consistent across observational military records of combat activity and civilian sentiment, and it is robust to a number of alternative model specifications. We pay particular attention to violations of the non-interference assumption inherent in designs in which spatial spillovers or displacement effects are possible. Rather than invoking conventional spatial models that require the researcher to prespecify the extent to which conflict processes interact across space, we leverage the work by de Paula, Rasul, and Souza (2020). We adapt their approach to the specific issue at hand: learning the pattern of spatial spillovers of conflict, and then using that information to directly control for the spillovers.

We investigate two plausible mechanisms empirically: withdrawal of foreign targets, and tactical complementarities. A reduced foreign troop presence and transition to local forces could have weakened Taliban mobilization due to a change in target type. While consistent with violence reductions after the first phase, this mechanism cannot explain the subsequent increase in Taliban attacks after withdrawal. The subsequent increase in violence is also inconsistent with the possibility that foreign troops were no longer needed to maintain stability, or the possibility that local forces were adequately prepared to operate independently. On the other hand, the combination of local operational command and indirect ISAF support could have produced significant security gains that were then reversed with the physical withdrawal of foreign troops; a range of empirical tests, however, shows no evidence of such complementarities between ISAF and the ANSF.

Instead, we argue that the main results are consistent with a third mechanism: "lying low." That is, insurgents strategically and temporarily draw down their

forces, in effect lying low until after counterinsurgents have sufficiently raised the cost of local re-intervention. While our primary contribution is to provide a first empirical record of an important security transition, we use a simple model to situate the observed patterns. NATO cannot directly observe the local capacity of the Taliban relative to the ANSF; thus, NATO bases its decision to physically withdraw troops on observed levels of violence during the transition period. A high-capacity Taliban can then decide to pursue a strategy of lying low as part of a pooling equilibrium, which facilitates the withdrawal of ISAF, and increases the ability of the Taliban to inflict violence when the transition is completed.

We contribute to several strands of literature in economics and political science. Prior work in economics has investigated the causes of civil conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003, Collier and Hoeffler 2004, Bazzi and Blattman 2014, Berman et al. 2017, Limodio 2019, Manacorda and Tesei 2020), and examined development interventions that occur during ongoing insurgencies (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Fetzer 2020; Beath et al. 2013; Crost, Felter, and Johnston 2014; Sexton 2016). Seminal theoretical work has highlighted the role of state capacity in shaping conflict dynamics, including the end of war (Wittman 1979; Werner 1999; Besley and Persson 2010; Padró i Miquel and Yared 2012; Powell 2013; Gennaioli and Voth 2015; Esteban, Morelli, and Rohner 2015). Other studies have focused on war fighting directly, exploring the effectiveness of various government tactics (Lyal 2009, Dell and Querubin 2018) and the use of violence by insurgents (König et al. 2017, Condra et al. 2018, Fetzer et al. 2021a). We advance this literature with the first exploration of conflict dynamics during a large-scale, foreign-to-local security transition.

Our study also yields potentially actionable insights regarding one of the costliest conflicts in modern history. Since 2001, the United States alone has invested \$1.07 trillion in combat operations, economic assistance, and soldier healthcare: all directly related to the war in Afghanistan. The human toll of the war was also substantial; by 2018, ISAF had lost 3,547 soldiers in combat operations, and at least 31,000 civilian deaths had also been documented. The security transition marked a turning point in the conflict, and it has been the subject of fierce political debates at all its stages: when it was announced, when it was implemented, and after it had been completed. The evidence we present demonstrates how the withdrawal of foreign forces influenced the stability of local political actors and institutions. It suggests how future transitions, including other NATO troop drawdowns, might be managed more effectively: addressing a significant gap in our understanding of a topic of immense economic and policy significance. More broadly, this study reinforces the importance of data collection and dissemination during and after armed conflict. Rigorously evaluating government interventions, especially force transitions, requires careful, ongoing measurement of local conditions and a commitment to making data, like the combat and survey records we study here, available for research.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section I provides background context on the security transition in Afghanistan, and describes the data used in this investigation. Section II reviews the empirical strategies we employ. Section III presents the main results. Section IV discusses the mechanisms that could explain our findings, providing a simple conceptual framework as well as discussing the external validity. Section V concludes.

I. Context and Data

A. Timing of the Security Transition

The war in Afghanistan led a large number of NATO countries to participate in ground operations under the umbrella of ISAF. According to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1386, ISAF's role was explicitly to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in rebuilding government institutions and providing security. From its inception, the mission was conceived as a temporary intervention. First steps toward a security transition were taken in November 2009, when then-President Hamid Karzai announced the desire to see a complete transition by the end of 2014. The United States subsequently announced that the transition process would begin in 2011. In July 2010, the Joint Afghan-NATO Inteqal Board (JANIB) was established to implement the transition process. JANIB selected a first tranche of districts for which the ANSF took over security, and President Karzai announced these districts in March 2011. The process was completed in five tranches, with an official transition ceremony to mark the completion of the transfer at the end of 2014 (NATO 2014a). These events are depicted on a timeline in Figure 1. The official *transfer of security responsibility* is the first phase of the broader transition process, with *ISAF base closures* and the ultimate physical withdrawal of ISAF troops as the second phase. The next subsections discuss these two transition phases in detail.

B. Security Transfer: Assignment to Transition Tranches

In November 2010, JANIB convened for the first time. Under the leadership of Dr. Ashraf Ghani (appointed by President Karzai as the Chairman of the Afghan Transition Coordination Commission) and co-chaired by ISAF Commander General David Petraeus and NATO representatives, the JANIB confirmed the 2011–2014 transition timeline. It emphasized stability and self-sufficiency as goals of transition. In February 2011, JANIB recommended the geographic areas assessed as prepared to begin the transition process. Authorization to proceed from Stabilization into Transition was decided by JANIB based on the following factors:²

- (i) The capability of the ANSF to shoulder additional security tasks with less assistance from ISAF;
- (ii) The level of security in the area, and the degree to which the local populace was able to pursue routine daily activities;
- (iii) The development of local governance structures, so that security would not be undermined as ISAF assistance diminished;
- (iv) The ability of ISAF to adjust its force levels and posture as the Afghan forces expanded their capabilities, and as threats to security were reduced.

²See "Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan," Department of Defense, April 2011, <https://bit.ly/37p8eKT>.




FIGURE 1. KEY DATES IN THE TRANSITION PROCESS

Notes: Dates of the different transition stages were obtained from the NATO publication *Inteqal: Transition to Afghan Lead*. The authors complemented the graphical timeline with auxiliary information.

Although these criteria suggest a rules-based approach, the actual assessments and recommendations of the JANIB board were not made public, and they remain classified. The final decision on the assignment to transition tranches was taken by the Afghan cabinet, where political considerations played an important role, too. For example, President Karzai is reported to have aimed at an ethnically and regionally balanced first tranche, resulting in the inclusion of districts in the first tranche that were not recommended. It was noted in 2012, that while NATO provided thorough security assessments “ultimately, the transfer decision lies with President Hamid Karzai and his principal advisor for transition, Ashraf Ghani. Complex political considerations, including ethnic balancing, at times influence the transfer decisions, despite ISAF’s advice.”³ Concerns over whether the JANIB board stuck to the initial aspiration set out in the Lisbon NATO summit of a conditions-based, not calendar-driven, process are highly questionable. As the process continued, the assignment of districts to different transition tranches became more and more opaque.⁴ While the allocation of districts to transition tranches was subject to discretion, NATO’s commitment to five tranches between 2011 and 2014 imposed constraints on the timing of the security transfers. The districts and their assignments to the ultimate transition tranches are presented in panel B of Figure 2.⁵ Our various difference-in-differences strategies exploit the temporal variation generated by the transition process. Section II provides details of these strategies, and presents event-study evidence and pretreatment effects to address concerns about endogeneity in the tranche assignments.

³See Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan Field Trip Report VII,” Brookings Institution, <https://brookings/3fSKhiT>.

⁴See Thomas Ruttig, “Opaque and Dilemma-Ridden: A Look Back at Transition,” *Afghan Analysts Network*, August 12, 2013, <https://bit.ly/37pjMxs>.

⁵We exclude Nimroz and Daykundi because they did not have a Provincial Reconstruction Team, and did not experience a security transition. We also exclude Mihtarlam district, as different parts of the district were transitioned at different points in time. Results are robust to not dropping these data.




FIGURE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF CONFLICT INTENSITY AND ASSIGNMENT OF DISTRICTS TO DIFFERENT TRANCHES OF THE SECURITY TRANSFER TO THE AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES (ANSF)

Notes: Panel A presents the distribution of conflict events in the SIGACTS data across the country. Panel B presents the different assignments of districts to the five different transition tranches.




FIGURE 3. SHARE OF SIGACTS EVENTS INVOLVING SECURITY FORCES

Notes: The figure plots the share of events per quarter by security force involvement. This measure is based on all events (including noncombat activities). Afghan security forces (ANSF) include all armed forces, including local and border police. Vertical lines indicate the quarter of the first and the last transition tranches.

It is important to highlight that the security transfers marked a real shift in responsibility, but did not represent a complete break. While ISAF troops were transferred out of lead combat roles, the coalition maintained a supporting and advisory role even after the transition. These trends are evident in Figure 3. This figure plots the share of recorded events in the SIGACTS conflict dataset (described in Section IE) that involved coalition and/or Afghan security forces together. Prior to the transition

onset, as ISAF was preparing Afghan forces for the handover of security responsibility, joint operations increased. This increase reflects the fact that Afghan forces were deployed to the field. Toward the end of the transition, Afghan forces absorbed the vast majority of all operations on their own. The transition announcement thus marks the gradual handover of security responsibility to local forces, which typically took between 3 and 12 months to complete, during which NATO gradually shifted into an oversight and supporting role otherwise known as overwatch. The date of the announcement of a tranche and the naming of districts that would participate in each wave was public information. We consider these security transfers the first phase of the transition process. The second phase of the transition was the formal withdrawal of troops and the closure of ISAF installations, which we describe in the next subsection.

C. Base Closures

Over the course of ISAF's engagement, up to 140,000 NATO troops operated out of an estimated 825 physical bases scattered across Afghanistan. The withdrawal of most NATO forces led to the closure, demolition, or handing over to Afghan Security Forces of nearly 800 of these bases. The vast majority of these bases were small, tactical positions, such as Observation Posts or check points that were hosting, at most, small troop consignments (SIGAR 2016). Only a handful of bases still remain in NATO operation under ISAF's small-scale, follow-up mission, Resolute Support, which officially began on January 1, 2015, and currently involves around 12,000 troops.

We faced a major challenge in collecting data on base-level deployments from more than 51 troop-sending countries; thus, we identified an alternative and robust method for measuring and coding base closures. We relied on a set of military facilities regularly mentioned in the US Department of Defense Periodic Occupational and Environmental Monitoring Summary (POEMS), which provides information about the physical environment and environmental hazards of main bases and smaller bases out of which NATO troops operated.⁶ The POEMS does not provide exact location information or the exact date when bases ceased to be used for operations. However, we used the list of 338 main base locations, and we conducted a systematic search of sources and references for each base (Fetzer et al. 2021b). We searched video and image-hosting platforms for time-stamped video and images shared on social media by many soldiers on deployment. In addition, we conducted systematic searches of main news sources using the LexisNexis and Factiva news databases, along with standard search-engine queries. For most bases we have several name variations as bases were sometimes named after fallen soldiers and our list also includes a substantial number of bases that were not exclusively under US command.

We were able to identify the district in which a subset of bases (170 of the 338 main bases) are located, and we were able to note when the base was closed, handed

⁶We restrict ourselves to the likely set of larger bases, such as forward operating bases, camps, combat outposts, and bases hosting the provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs). There is no clear size ranking. The PRTs are particularly important as most were operated by multinational forces.

over to the Afghan Security Forces, or “retrograded” or demolished. It is likely that our sample is biased toward including bases that were not physically demolished but were handed over to the ANSF. We cannot confirm whether a base that was handed over to the ANSF was subsequently used by Afghan forces. Given the lack of spatial accuracy and the potential measurement error, we aggregate the information to the district level, computing the date that the last base was either retrograded or handed over in a district. Lastly, we also obtained data on the public handover ceremonies that were usually held at the end of the formal withdrawal process in the provincial capitals. Since our base closure data do not provide us with a date for all districts in a province, we infer the physical withdrawal date based on these handover ceremonies.

Base transitions and withdrawals tend to happen after the formal transfer of security responsibility (i.e., after the first phase of the transition). Panel A of Figure 4 presents the timing of the transition tranche announcement relative to the recorded transition ceremony or base closure in months. The pattern that emerges is quite evident: relative to the transition onset date, base closures and handovers were happening earlier in remote areas than in geographic centers. We argue that this pattern is a consequence of the logistic organization of the withdrawal process, not a coincidence or artifact of dataset construction. A host of compelling anecdotal documentation provides further support to this view, which we discuss below.

D. Exploiting Logistic Constraints as an Instrument for the Timing of Base Closures

The physical withdrawal of ISAF troops and material was a significant logistical challenge. Withdrawal was impeded by several factors. We exploit these factors to inform the construction of an instrumental variable to isolate as-if random variation in the sequencing of the physical closure of ISAF bases. First, the closest accessible sea port was Karachi, Pakistan, requiring transit through the Khyber Pass. This route was shut down during the early phase of the transition (2011, 2012) after an airstrike accidentally killed Pakistani troops. Second, convoys using the land-based route through Uzbekistan’s Salang Pass were restricted from carrying weapons. Third, land-based consolidation of heavy machinery was restricted by poor road infrastructure in Afghanistan. Fourth, restrictions on equipment handover created a substantial burden: the United States alone had \$36 billion worth of heavy equipment, armaments, and sensitive resources that needed to be relocated. Together, ISAF forces needed to move more than 70,000 vehicles and 120,000 industrial shipping containers (Van Loven 2013).

To address these challenges, ISAF used heavy-duty, long-haul C-17 Globemaster planes to transport equipment from Afghanistan to Kuwait. The size of these aircraft implied that only a few airports could be used as retrograde hubs. These nodal bases informed both the timing and geographic sequencing of the pullout. Smaller or remote bases were handed over first, with materials consolidated around larger bases with transport capabilities. Forward Operating Base (FOB) Torkham in Momand Dara district of Nangarhar province offers an illustrative example. The base was formally handed over to the ANSF on December 18, 2013. FOB Torkham was located on the border with Pakistan. Despite the relative proximity of a transit




FIGURE 4. TIMING OF BASE CLOSURE RELATIVE TO DISTRICT TRANCHE ANNOUNCEMENT AND TRAVEL DISTANCE TO NEAREST RETROGRADE LOGISTIC HUB

Notes: Panel A visually presents the variation in the timing of the base closure (“Troop withdrawal”) dates relative to the transition onset announcements (“security handover”). If a district is matched with several bases, the timing is determined by the date of the last recorded base that was retrograded or handed over. Panel B presents visually the least-cost, shortest path distance between a district centroid to one of the 10 retrograde logistic hubs used in the withdrawal operation. We assume a unit cost of crossing via paved roads; the cost of crossing via an unpaved road occurs two units of costs per unit of distance, while crossing terrain without roads incurs a cost of 10 units. Least-cost paths are computed used Dijkstra’s algorithm.

point to leave Afghanistan, most of the equipment from FOB Torkham was sent 73 km inland to Jalalabad Airfield by road and using sling-loaded CH-53 helicopters. From there, materials were transferred an additional 185 kilometers to the Bagram north of Kabul. From there, materials were flown out to Kuwait using C-17 Globemaster airplanes.⁷

The discussion above suggests that access to a small subset of bases was crucial up until the last stages of the military pullout. As a consequence, bases were closed from the outside in, consecutively starting with the outlying bases with difficult or limited access to these central transport hubs. We use this information, together with information on the available road network (AIMS 2013), to construct a variable capturing the travel distance on the least-cost path to one of the ten logistical hubs (AIMS 2000, Fetzer 2021b). The resulting instrument is presented in panel B of Figure 4. We show that our results are robust to controlling for a host of other distance measures, most importantly, the distance to the nearest airport of any type (i.e., including airfields not suited for heavy cargo planes).

⁷ See C. Todd Lopez, “Reliable Tempo Draws Down 13-Year Combat Footprint in Afghanistan,” *Military News*, April 17, 2015, <https://bit.ly/33vw7iH>.

E. *Measuring Conflict Activity and Perceptions*

We rely on two novel microlevel data sources that allow us to combine results from institutionally tracked conflict data with detailed survey data.

Significant Activities Event Data.—Afghanistan provides a rich environment for investigating security transitions, and as we describe below, our study overcomes several critical obstacles that usually limit the ability to draw meaningful and robust inferences. We rely on newly declassified microdata collected by ISAF and local national security partners secured by Shaver and Wright (2016). Throughout the ongoing conflict, these security forces have tracked insurgent attacks by documenting the approximate time and precise location of attacks perpetrated against them or reported to them. This dataset includes more than 200,000 individual observations of insurgent attacks between 2008 and 2014, each of which is identified by attack type (e.g., attack by direct fire, attack via the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs))(Shaver and Wright n.d.).

Afghan insurgents undertook several primary types of attacks throughout the war. These involved attacks from direct fire, IEDs, and other combat activity. Direct fire includes attacks perpetrated at close range (direct line-of-sight encounters). Individual insurgents (often acting in groups) carry out these attacks in a variety of ways. IEDs tend to be directed against moving targets (e.g., vehicle patrols and convoys); IEDs are typically placed on or immediately around roadways. Our data also track indirect fire combat events. Indirect fire refers to attacks that include mortars and rockets, which can be launched from much greater distances, but tend to be far less accurate. Nevertheless, even when mortars and rockets fail to strike their intended target, they often create loud explosions that can be heard over relatively large distances.

Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research Survey Data.—Our survey evidence relies on the Afghanistan Nationwide Quarterly Assessment Research (ANQAR) platform (NATO n.d.). ANQAR tracks civilian attitudes toward government, anti-government entities, and coalition partners. Survey responses are collected on a quarterly basis by local contractors. Before administering a survey wave, local elders are contacted to secure permission for enumerators to enter villages. When enumerators could not access sampled villages, intercept interviews were used to collect information from residents traveling in neighboring areas (Child 2016). Questions vary by survey wave, but the questions most relevant to our investigation are consistently included. Although early waves have higher nonresponse rates than later waves, these rates are consistently lower (5–10 percent) than those of comparable national surveys conducted in the United States and Europe (Condra and Wright 2019). We have restricted access to data from 2008 to 2016, covering roughly 370,000 respondents, through a data-sharing agreement with NATO. Summary statistics of the data are presented in online Appendix Table A1.

Other Data Sources Used.—We rely on digital placemats from ISAF archives to link districts to regional commands, and we classify districts using a standardized administrative map compiled by the Empirical Studies of Conflict (ESOC)

research group (Weidmann 2010, NATO 2014b, United States Army 2011). All events and survey waves are rectified to match this map. We incorporate information from the Afghan Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), which is a military-led scheme for small-scale development projects (Walker n.d.). These data were obtained through formal channels; these data cover new projects initiated until the beginning of 2014, and they include projects that were active during 2014 and beyond. In addition, our empirical analysis includes detailed land-cover data (Friedl and Sulla-Menashe 2019, Hsu et al. 2015), grid-cell population data (WorldPop 2013), and measures of elevation and terrain features (EROS 2017) that we exploit in our empirical designs.

II. Empirical Strategy

Our paper studies the impact of the two main phases of the security transition: (i) the transfer of control from ISAF to the ANSF, and (ii) the physical withdrawal of ISAF troops. We rely on different strategies to estimate these effects, which we detail in this section. Lastly, we discuss in detail how we leverage new methods from spatial econometrics to flexibly control for conflict displacement.

A. Security Transfer to ANSF

Our baseline empirical strategy is a difference-in-differences approach, comparing districts in which the security transition has been implemented to nontreated districts, before and after the transition:

$$(1) \quad y_{d,r,t} = \alpha_d + \beta_{r,t} + \gamma \times \text{Handover}_{d,t} + \eta_d \times t + \epsilon_{d,r,t}.$$

In the equation above, d indicates the district, r the Regional Command (RC) and t the quarter. Note, $\text{Handover}_{d,t}$ switches on when ANSF takes over from ISAF. At the district and quarter level our outcome measures $y_{d,r,t}$ come from both the SIGACTS incident and ANQAR survey data. While the SIGACTS data contains finer time-stamps, the ANQAR survey data are collected quarterly. In order to maintain consistency, we use the quarterly frequency for the district-level analysis. We allow each district to follow a specific linear trend $\eta_d \times t$, and we allow for regional command specific nonlinear time effects ($\beta_{r,t}$). The RC, indexed by r , served as one of the most important organizational units in ISAF, and it is possible that reporting practices differed by regional command; hence the choice of the time fixed effects.

Our preferred outcome for the SIGACTS data at the district level is the logarithm of incidents (plus one). This specification allows us to capture changes on the extensive and intensive margins, but is less sensitive to vertical outliers.⁸ Our estimate of the coefficient γ captures the causal impact of the security transition as long as conflict in districts in different transition tranches were following common

⁸Our results are robust to alternative transformations of the dependent variable. We present these results in online Appendix Tables A6 and A7: the inverse hyperbolic sine (asinh), per capita specifications using different population measures, and level outcomes (i.e., counts) in a Poisson model. In online Appendix Section B we present results from another identification strategy that uses smaller grid-cells, and works with binary violence outcomes.

trends. As discussed in the background section, the selection into different transition tranches was based on a variety of factors that were not clearly linked to trends in violence. To validate our estimates, we provide evidence in support of the common trends assumption based on both event studies around the transition dates, and on the estimation of pretreatment effects. We introduce these tests later. As a baseline, Online Appendix Table A2 shows that several baseline characteristics were not balanced at the district level. However, more violent districts are not systematically allocated to later tranches. There are few significant differences between violence levels when we compare tranches 1 to 2, and 3 to 4. Only tranches 3 and 5 appear to have been more violent compared to the preceding tranche.⁹ Our basic district-level panel includes district-specific, linear time trends to alleviate the concerns associated with these baseline differences.

B. ISAF Troop Withdrawal

At the end of the transition process, the vast majority of the troops with ISAF physically left Afghanistan. While the troop withdrawal was made possible by the transfer of control to the ANSF, its timing was not mechanically linked to the formal security transfers. Unlike the transfer process, which was constrained by a fixed schedule of five tranches, the decision to close or hand over individual bases was highly discretionary and district specific. Closures were in part driven by local assessment of Afghan troop training and preparation to operate independent of foreign support. The endogenous sequencing of base closures may overstate subsequent battlefield gains. On the other hand, the Taliban may have been more effective at launching attacks against ANSF forces after withdrawal. These two dynamics could offset one another, yielding naïve estimates that are biased toward zero. This makes identification of the effect of the withdrawal phase particularly challenging.

We try to overcome these identification concerns by exploiting the importance of logistical constraints for the withdrawal process. As described in Section ID, a small number of military-grade airports acted as crucial logistical hubs during the withdrawal process. We hypothesize that bases that were farthest removed from these airports saw their ISAF troops leave first once the transition process started (i.e., after 2011). We use a least-cost path algorithm (illustrated in Figure 4) to calculate distances from every district to the nearest military airport, and we use the interaction of this distance measure with a dummy for the post-2011 period as an instrument for ISAF troop withdrawal. The corresponding first stage is

$$(2) \quad c_{d,r,t} = \alpha_d + \beta_{r,t} + \gamma \times \text{Handover}_{d,t} + \lambda \times \text{Hub Distance}_d \times \text{Post}_t \\ + \zeta_t \times X_d + \eta_d \times t + \epsilon_{d,r,t}$$

where $c_{d,r,t}$ is a dummy indicator that switches to 1 when, according to our dataset, the last military base has closed in the district. This outcome is defined at the district level, and its construction is described in detail in Section IC. Since our

⁹As a robustness check, we present treatment effects by tranche in online Appendix Table A11.

measurement approach and identification strategy leverage district-level variation, we employ a district-level panel following the main specification for the security transfer above. We keep the security transfer in the baseline-instrumented specification, as it typically precedes the withdrawal. To isolate the effect of distance to military airports, our main specifications flexibly control for time-varying effects of the distance to the nearest airport (of any type) as well as distance to the province border (i.e., these distance measures enter X_d). A more demanding specification includes tranche-specific time effects, which fully absorb any level effect of the transition captured by the variable $Handover_{d,t}$, thus relying only on the within-tranche variation to estimate λ .

In the second stage, we model violence outcomes $y_{d,t}$ as follows:

$$(3) \quad y_{d,r,t} = \alpha_d + \beta_{r,t} + \gamma \times Handover_{d,t} + \kappa \times \hat{c}_{d,r,t} + \zeta_t \times X_d \\ + \eta_d \times t + \epsilon_{d,r,t}$$

where κ is the quantity of interest associated with $\hat{c}_{d,r,t}$, the instrumented withdrawal sequence. For the exclusion restriction to hold, the differential effect of the distance to military-grade airports after 2011 on conflict outcomes can only operate through the withdrawal of ISAF troops. Importantly, the inclusion of unit fixed effects addresses any time-invariant sources of bias that are district specific and correlated with proximity to military airfields, including geographic suitability for rural insurgent activity. Our identification strategy leverages only the differential effect of proximity after the withdrawal begins. Any operational disruptions across regional commands over time that may be correlated with the sequencing of closures are also absorbed in our benchmark fixed effects. The exclusion restriction could still be violated if the time-varying effects of military airfield proximity are correlated with time-varying effects of nearby market activity. The inclusion of time-varying effects of other market-oriented distances, such as distance to any type of airport in our vector of covariates X_d , helps address this concern. The withdrawal may have coincided with a shift in Taliban activity away from remote areas near provincial borders along the outer reach of ISAF-supported provincial reconstruction teams, and toward population centers. We account for this potential source of bias by incorporating the time-varying effects of proximity to provincial borders. It is also possible that districts in different cohorts (handover tranches) were exposed to correlated shocks to military equipment, training, or preparation that impacted base closures. The importance of these factors could have varied over time as the transition and withdrawal neared completion. We account for these factors in two ways: directly controlling for the timing of the handover, and, in a separate approach, flexibly estimating tranche-specific time effects.

C. Conflict Displacement

We now consider a specification that adds displacement effects to the difference-and-differences (equation (1)) and instrumental-variable specifications (equation (3)). One potential concern is that insurgent activity is likely highly mobile, and that the transition to ANSF might have induced a strategic reallocation

to other districts. In this case, spillovers may affect the identification of transition effects: both at the onset and at the withdrawal. We consider a specification with spatial spillover effects to account for possible transition externalities. In what follows, we focus on the version of the difference-in-differences specification (1) with spatial controls. The instrumental-variable version follows with minimal changes. We implement a specification of the form:

$$(4) \quad y_{d,r,t} = \alpha_d + \beta_{r,t} + \gamma \text{Handover}_{d,t} + \delta \sum_{j=1, j \neq d}^N w_{d,j} \text{Handover}_{j,t} \\ + \rho \sum_{j=1, j \neq d}^N w_{d,j} y_{j,r,t} + \eta_d \times t + \epsilon_{d,r,t}$$

where $w_{d,j}$ captures the extent to which district j affects d . The spillover effects may happen either because conflict in district d is affected by handover in other districts (through the combined transition indicator $\delta \sum_{j=1, j \neq d}^N w_{d,j} \text{Handover}_{j,t}$, or “exogenous effects”) or by conflict in other districts (through $\rho \sum_{j=1, j \neq d}^N w_{d,j} y_{j,r,t}$ or “endogenous effects,” both after Manski 1993). The presence of district-time linear interactions and regional command-time nonlinear effects control for the correlated effects.

We explore several specifications of (4) with different choices of weights. Our exercises also leverage a novel estimation strategy taken from de Paula, Rasul, and Souza (2020) to recover the weights $w_{d,j}$ along with the parameters γ , δ , and ρ from within the data. We find the main treatment effects to be robust to the inclusion of spatial controls over a vast array of specifications. More details are provided in online Appendix Section A.

III. Main Results

We first discuss the effect of the security transfer to ANSF, and then present estimates of the impact of ISAF troop withdrawal.

A. Phase I: Security Handover to ANSF

Table 1 shows the effects of the security transition for the most important conflict outcomes in our military records: casualty events, direct fire attacks, and IED (Improvised Explosive Device) explosions. Our baseline difference-in-differences specification at the district level shows that the intensity of violence dropped sharply when the ANSF became responsible for security provision. We estimate that the security transition led to approximately 0.12 standard deviations (SD) decline in casualty events overall, with a 0.1 SD reduction in direct line-of-sight combat events and a 0.075 SD decline in IED explosions. While the inclusion of district-specific trends and $\text{RC} \times \text{time}$ fixed effects weakens the results slightly, the estimated effects remain large and precisely estimated in this demanding specification. To validate our estimates, we introduce a number of event studies, which are presented in Figure 5. They provide evidence of the common trends assumption that underlies our difference-in-differences estimates. We see flat trends prior to the security transition, and marked drops once security responsibility had been formally handed

TABLE 1—SECURITY TRANSFER TO AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES AND CONFLICT (SIGACTS)

	$\log(x + 1)$					
	All casualty events		Direct fire attacks		IED explosions	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Security handover	-0.138 (0.032)	-0.098 (0.031)	-0.134 (0.036)	-0.066 (0.035)	-0.074 (0.029)	-0.078 (0.029)
Mean DV	0.920	0.920	1.145	1.145	0.686	0.686
SD DV	1.137	1.137	1.319	1.319	0.984	0.984
Observations	10,556	10,556	10,556	10,556	10,556	10,556
Number of districts	377	377	377	377	377	377
District time trend	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: Regressions at the district-quarter level, covering the period 2008–2014. All regressions include district fixed effects and regional command \times time fixed effects. Outcomes are subject to a $\log(x + 1)$ transformation. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and presented in parentheses.




FIGURE 5. EVENT STUDIES AROUND THE SECURITY TRANSFER TO AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES (SIGACTS)

Notes: Event studies around the security handover to the Afghan National Security Forces, using quarterly district-level data (2008–2014). Coefficients on “time to security handover” are shown with 90 percent confidence intervals. The models are analogous to column 1 in Table 1, but they include time-to-treatment dummies. Outcomes are subject to a $\log(x + 1)$ transformation. Regressions include district fixed effects and regional command \times time fixed effects.

over to ANSF, as indicated by the vertical line in the subfigures. In Figure 6, we present coefficient estimates from our main specification for a wider set of violence outcomes. These additional outcomes include casualty events involving security




FIGURE 6. EFFECT OF THE SECURITY TRANSFER TO AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES ON CONFLICT (SIGACTS)

Notes: Coefficients and 90 percent confidence intervals on security handover in a model that is analogous to column 2 in Table 1. Data are at the district-quarter level (2008–2014). Regressions include district fixed effects, regional command \times time fixed effects, and district-specific trends. Outcomes are subject to a $\log(x + 1)$ transformation. Full results can be found in online Appendix Table A3.

forces, civilians, and insurgents, as well as indirect fire attacks. Across this broader set of violence measures, we observe consistent drops in conflict (between 0.065 and 0.15 of a standard deviation) after the responsibility for security provision has been transferred to ANSF.

We present the analysis of the spatial spillovers in online Appendix Table A4 for the SIGACTS data. In column 1, we replicate the coefficients from the differences-in-differences analysis. Columns 2–7 initially implement standard spatial spillover regressions with known and given proximity matrices (e.g., Harari and La Ferrara 2018). More specifically, we define as two districts as “connected” if they are neighbors, neighbors of neighbors; within neighboring provinces; within a geodesical distance of less than 250 km or 500 km; and within a driving distance of less than 500 km. As motivated in Section IIC, those specifications are rather restrictive because they impose very strong assumptions behind the mechanism of displacement. Thus, we also utilize the data to inform about the pattern of spillovers. This is accomplished by estimating the weights $w_{d,j}$, and the results are seen in columns 8–10 for various specifications. To slightly reduce the dimensionality of the problem, we assume that districts that are too distant (with driving distances above 500 km and, separately with driving distances above 1,000 km) are unconnected and thus $w_{d,j} = 0$. In all cases, we observe that the majority of the point estimates for the treatment effects are robust to the inclusion of displacement effects.

TABLE 2—SECURITY TRANSFER TO AFGHAN NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES AND PERCEPTION OF SECURITY (ANQAR)

	Security		Afghan National Security Force presence and control		
	Improved security (1)	Taliban weaker (2)	See Afghan National Army monthly (3)	Afghan National Security Forces bring security (4)	Taliban control (5)
Security handover	0.027 (0.015)	0.025 (0.017)	0.031 (0.018)	0.024 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.013)
Mean DV	0.321	0.432	0.697	0.508	0.189
SD DV	0.221	0.235	0.318	0.236	0.227
Observations	8,523	7,835	8,308	8,522	8,523
Number of districts	375	375	375	375	375

Notes: Regressions at the district-quarter level, covering the period 2008–2016. All regressions include district fixed effects, regional command \times time fixed effects, and district-specific trends. The dependent variables measure shares of respondents at the district level. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and presented in parentheses.

Table 2 shows results for ANQAR survey responses. The ANQAR data are only available at the district level, and, for consistency, we report results for the most demanding specifications at this level. Table 2 includes measures that are systematically collected across many different ANQAR survey waves independently from the SIGACTS data. These results suggest that the shift in security perceptions matches the changes we observed in the tactical reports.

The share of respondents who reported security improved in the last six months after the ANSF took over security (column 1) increased by approximately 0.12 SD. They also perceive that the Taliban had grown weaker since the transition (column 2) (0.1 SD), even if this effect is marginally insignificant. Moreover, respondents were more likely to have seen the Afghan National Army (ANA) (i.e., the most important component of the ANSF) in their village at least once a month (column 3), and they were more likely to respond that the Afghan forces bring security to their area (column 4), each shifting about 0.1 SD. This suggests that the formal transfer of security responsibility during the transition process is clearly perceived as such. The consistency of our results across data types (military records and individual survey evidence), together with our demanding empirical designs, gives us confidence in the robustness of this core finding.¹⁰ Yet, as shown in column 5 of Table 2, the security transfer does not appear to have affected the perceptions of the local population about who is actually in control of their area. This suggests that the security transfer, while being associated with improvements in the perceived security situation, seems to have failed at shifting the underlying fundamentals of the conflict. This result foreshadows our findings regarding the second phase of the security transition.

¹⁰In particular for the quality of the SIGACTS data may have been affected by the security transition itself despite continuous collection throughout NATO's withdrawal (as evidenced in panel A of online Appendix Figure A2). The consistency across the two data sources is thus reassuring.

TABLE 3—COALITION TROOP WITHDRAWAL: FIRST STAGE

	Troop withdrawal		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Travel distance to military airport \times post 2011	1.728 (0.237)	1.898 (0.235)	2.007 (0.236)
Security handover	0.193 (0.028)	0.190 (0.029)	
Mean DV	0.388	0.388	0.388
SD DV	0.487	0.487	0.487
<i>F</i> -statistic on instrument	53.325	65.292	72.141
Observations	13,572	13,572	13,572
Number of districts	377	377	377
IV control set \times time fixed effects	No	Yes	Yes
Tranche \times time fixed effects	No	No	Yes

Notes: Regressions at the district-quarter level, covering the period 2008–2016. All regressions include district fixed effects, regional command \times time fixed effects, and district-specific trends. The additional IV control set includes the distance to any airport and to the province border. The dependent variable is *Troop withdrawal*, which is a binary indicator for the last recorded base closure, retrograde, or handover at the district level. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and presented in parentheses.

B. Phase II: Withdrawal of ISAF Troops

The initial transfer of security to the ANSF was followed by the gradual closure of ISAF bases. As discussed in Section IC, the logistical challenges of organizing the troop withdrawal imposed a certain structure on the military pullout. We instrument the sequence of base closure with the interaction of the distance to the closest military airport hub and a dummy for the post-2011 period (see equations (2) and (3)). Table 3 presents the first-stage results and confirms that our interacted distance measure does a good job predicting the timing of base closures in a district. This remains true when we control for distance to the closest airport of any type (i.e., including nonmilitary airports) and province borders in column 2, as well as for time-varying effects of the transition tranche in column 3.

We take the instrumental variable strategy and contrast our IV estimates with the naïve OLS results in Table 4. The OLS results, presented in panel A, suggest that base closures are not associated with any significant changes in conflict outcomes. As we argued earlier, the OLS estimates could suffer from endogeneity problems because the district-specific sequencing of base closures was highly discretionary and likely influenced by local assessments of Afghan troop training and battlefield readiness. If bases were closed earlier in districts where violence was expected to decrease, the OLS coefficients we estimate would mask any violence-enhancing effect of foreign troop withdrawal. If the magnitude of these cross-cutting effects is comparable, we would expect to estimate an OLS result close to zero, which is what we find.

Panel B of Table 4 presents our IV results. When we instrument for the sequencing of base closure using the time-varying effect of military airfield proximity, we find a consistent violence-increasing effect of the base closure on our main conflict

TABLE 4—COALITION TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND CONFLICT (SIGACTS)

	$\log(x + 1)$					
	All casualty events		Direct fire attacks		IED explosions	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>Panel A. District level: OLS</i>						
Troop withdrawal	0.003 (0.035)	-0.000 (0.037)	-0.006 (0.041)	0.001 (0.043)	-0.008 (0.029)	-0.008 (0.031)
Security handover	-0.103 (0.031)		-0.057 (0.036)		-0.094 (0.029)	
Mean DV	0.920	0.920	1.145	1.145	0.686	0.686
SD DV	1.137	1.137	1.319	1.319	0.984	0.984
Observations	10,556	10,556	10,556	10,556	10,556	10,556
Number of districts	377	377	377	377	377	377
Tranche \times time fixed effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
<i>Panel B. District level: IV</i>						
Troop withdrawal	0.666 (0.308)	0.616 (0.296)	0.572 (0.327)	0.495 (0.310)	0.773 (0.305)	0.730 (0.287)
Security handover	-0.205 (0.059)		-0.146 (0.063)		-0.214 (0.062)	
Mean DV	0.920	0.920	1.145	1.145	0.686	0.686
SD DV	1.137	1.137	1.319	1.319	0.984	0.984
Weak IV statistic	48.751	57.882	48.751	57.882	48.751	57.882
Observations	10,556	10,556	10,556	10,556	10,556	10,556
Number of districts	377	377	377	377	377	377
Tranche \times time fixed effects	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: Regressions at the district-quarter level, covering the period 2008–2014. All regressions include district fixed effects, regional command \times time fixed effects, and district-specific trends. The instrument used for *Troop withdrawal* is the interaction of the travel distance to the nearest military airport and an indicator for the post-2011 period. The IV control set includes distance to any airport \times time fixed effects, and distance to province borders \times time fixed effects. Outcomes are subject to a $\log(x + 1)$ transformation. The weak IV statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F -statistic. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and presented in parentheses.

outcomes in columns 1 through 6. The post-withdrawal increase in violence ranges from approximately 0.4 to 0.7 SD. In fact, contrasting the direct effect of the security handover with the effect of the base closures in columns 1, 3, and 5, the increase in violence due to the base closures fully offsets the reductions in combat activity due to the security transfer, with a net increase in conflict of approximately 0.3 SD.

This finding is robust to using exclusively within-tranche variation, by including a set of tranche \times time fixed effects (in columns 2, 4, and 6). Hence, the uptick in violence cannot be explained by a general time pattern that is specific to districts belonging to an individual tranche. Rather, the increased violence appears to reflect an effect that is specific to the physical withdrawal of international troops independent of the transfer announcement. In Figure 7 we study a broader set of conflict outcomes at the district level. We also implement our spatial econometric technique for calibrating network weights, and we introduce them in the IV framework. In online Appendix Table A5 we confirm that the estimates are robust to the inclusion of spillover controls.

To what extent do these distinct effects on conflict outcomes map into changes in the perceived security situation? In Table 5, we present results studying ANQAR survey-response data. In panel A, we estimate both the effect of the security transition onset, as well as the effect of the (instrumented) physical base closure. The




FIGURE 7. COALITION TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND CONFLICT (SIGACTS)

Notes: Coefficients and 90 percent confidence intervals on “Troop withdrawal” in a model that is analogous to column 1 in Table 4. Data are at the district-quarter level (2008–2014). All regressions include district fixed effects, regional command \times time fixed effects, and district-specific trends. The instrument used for “Troop withdrawal” is the interaction of the travel distance to the nearest military airport and an indicator for the post-2011 period. The IV control set includes distance to any airport \times time fixed effects, and distance to province borders \times time fixed effects. Outcomes are subject to a $\log(x + 1)$ transformation. Full results can be found in online Appendix Table A3.

picture that emerges is consistent with our findings from the SIGACTS conflict data; while the transition onset is associated with a marked improvement in the perceived security situation, the physical withdrawal and base closure are associated with a reported worsening of the security situation. Accounting for both phases of the security transition, perceived security deteriorated by more than 0.4 SD. In addition, perceptions that the Taliban had grown weaker strongly reverse, suggesting that civilians believe the Taliban had, indeed, become stronger after bases were closed. Despite a notable increase in reported Afghan troop patrols, civilians suggested that local forces were less likely to bring security after the withdrawal of foreign forces. In panel B, we study the same outcomes, yet, only exploiting within-tranche variation. This precludes the estimation of the security transfer to ANSF because this variable is perfectly collinear with the tranche-by-time fixed effects. Our results remain robust, suggesting that the closure of bases is indeed associated with a significant worsening of the security situation. Before turning to a discussion of the underlying mechanism, we highlight the additional robustness checks that we performed.

C. Robustness

In the online Appendix, we introduce a range of robustness checks.

TABLE 5—COALITION TROOP WITHDRAWAL AND SECURITY PERCEPTIONS (ANQAR)

	Security		Afghan National Security Forces presence and control		
	Improved security (1)	Taliban weaker (2)	See Afghan National Army Monthly (3)	Afghan National Security Forces bring security (4)	Taliban control (5)
<i>Panel A. District level</i>					
Troop withdrawal	-0.177 (0.054)	-0.205 (0.056)	0.160 (0.078)	-0.121 (0.056)	-0.067 (0.057)
Security handover	0.062 (0.019)	0.061 (0.020)	-0.008 (0.022)	0.044 (0.019)	0.009 (0.018)
Mean DV	0.321	0.432	0.697	0.508	0.189
SD DV	0.221	0.235	0.318	0.236	0.227
Weak IV statistic	63.465	63.577	63.390	63.476	63.465
Observations	8,523	7,835	8,308	8,522	8,523
Number of districts	375	375	375	375	375
<i>Panel B. District level, Tranche × time fixed effects</i>					
Troop withdrawal	-0.171 (0.053)	-0.184 (0.055)	0.132 (0.075)	-0.127 (0.053)	-0.062 (0.056)
Mean DV	0.321	0.432	0.697	0.508	0.189
SD DV	0.221	0.235	0.318	0.236	0.227
Weak IV statistic	71.736	72.213	71.722	71.743	71.736
Observations	8,523	7,835	8,308	8,522	8,523
Number of districts	375	375	375	375	375

Notes: Regressions at the district-quarter level, covering the period 2008–2016. All regressions include district fixed effects, regional command × time fixed effects, and district-specific trends. The instrument used for *Troop withdrawal* is the interaction of the travel distance to the nearest military airport and an indicator for the post-2011 period. The IV control set includes distance to any airport × time fixed effects, and distance to province borders × time fixed effects. The dependent variables measure shares of respondents at the district level. The weak IV statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald *F*-statistic. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and presented in parentheses.

Matched Distant Gridcell Pairs.—In an attempt to relax the identification assumption that underlies our main district level difference-in-differences approach, we change the unit of analysis to 10 × 10 km gridcells. This is only possible for the SIGACTS data, as the ANQAR survey data are reported at the district level. In the resulting high-resolution dataset, we construct pairs of matched gridcells using baseline population, elevation, road connections, and land-cover data. The gridcell-level outcomes show reductions in violence that are larger although it should be kept in mind that this is at the extensive margin of our violence outcomes. For more details on the matching procedure, see online Appendix Section B. For the summary statistics at the gridcell level, see Table A8. Results for the gridcell analysis are presented in Table A10, along with event study graphs in Figure A3.

Tranche-by-Tranche Effects.—We look at heterogeneous effects by tranche in Table A11. We confirm that the effects are not driven by a single tranche. Even if the magnitudes differ across tranches, the signs are consistent and significant for key outcomes in multiple tranches.

Pretreatment Effects.—We study whether the security transfer to ANSF has effects prior to the treatment announcement for the broader set of outcomes in

Figures A4 and A5. The vast majority of these pretreatment effects are insignificant and small compared to the actual treatment effects.

IV. Mechanisms

Afghanistan's security transition could affect violence outcomes through a large set of mechanisms. We consider several plausible alternative mechanisms below.

A. Withdrawal of Foreign Targets

In principle, the transfer of security to the ANSF could reduce violence because the ability of the Taliban to mobilize was weakened by the security transition. However, this explanation cannot account for the increase in violence we observe after the base closures. Another interpretation of the reduction in local violence following the security transfer, is that the ANSF were more effective, for example because they monopolized violence better than the multinational ISAF, or because they coordinated more effectively with the local population. In this sense, foreign troops were perhaps no longer required to support security provision. These mechanisms are similarly consistent with the decline in violence after the first phase of the transition, but are inconsistent with the violence-increasing effect of base closures and withdrawal.

B. Complementarities during the Transition Period

Our main results are consistent with the idea that complementarities between ISAF and ANSF generate improved security outcomes, to the extent that ISAF base closures eliminate the gains in security outcomes that accompany the security transfer. These complementarities could arise because ISAF monitors the ANSF, and provides military support after local forces take operational command. The combination of the ANSF leading operations and receiving feedback, combat support, and development assistance could have reduced violence during the first phase. These gains could have been reversed with the end of overwatch and the physical withdrawal of troops. In Table 6, we investigate the complementarities mechanism. Additional monitoring during the first phase could have reduced misbehavior by Afghan troops, improving community relations, but we find no evidence of that type of shift (column 1). We also find no evidence of a change in perceived ability of the ANSF to operate independently of ISAF, or of ANSF capacity to defeat the Taliban following the security handover (columns 2 and 3). We also find no evidence that one dominant form of development assistance, the US Army Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP), was targeted to enhance the effectiveness of Afghan forces during the transition process (column 4).

We also investigate potential complementarities in tactical support activities (online Appendix Table A12). In particular, we might expect that foreign forces would be marginally more likely to respond to violent events that trigger combat support following the security handover. Columns 1 and 3 of online Appendix Table A12 show that close air support and medical evacuations are highly correlated with contemporaneous close combat and direct fire attacks, yet columns 2 and 4 show no

TABLE 6—SECURITY FORCE ACTIVITY

	Improper behavior by ANA (1)	ANA needs full international support (2)	ANA will most likely defeat insurgents (3)	CERP spending $\log(x + 1)$ (4)
Troop withdrawal	0.009 (0.092)	0.099 (0.048)	-0.056 (0.054)	1.419 (2.255)
Security handover	-0.012 (0.019)	-0.009 (0.015)	0.015 (0.016)	-0.567 (0.480)
Mean DV	0.156	0.243	0.380	3.502
SD DV	0.195	0.191	0.229	5.359
Weak IV statistic	27.208	63.476	63.465	48.751
Observations	6,486	8,521	8,523	10,556
Number of districts	360	375	375	377

Notes: Regressions at the district-quarter level, covering the period 2008–2016 (2008–2014 for column 4). All regressions include district fixed effects, regional command \times time fixed effects, and district-specific trends. The instrument used for *Troop withdrawal* is the interaction of the travel distance to the nearest military airport and an indicator for the post-2011 period. The IV control set includes distance to any airport \times time fixed effects, and distance to province borders \times time fixed effects. The dependent variables in columns 1–3 measure the share of respondents in the ANQAR survey at the district level. Column 4 contains CERP spending, which is subject to a $\log(x + 1)$ transformation. The CERP data include projected spending in 2014. The weak IV statistic is the Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F -statistic. Standard errors are clustered at the district level and presented in parentheses.

marginal changes in combat support after the security handover. Column 5 shows that IED explosions coincide with additional bomb clearance, yet bomb neutralization does not significantly improve during the security handover (column 6). It is still possible that Afghan troops experienced a temporary, unobserved shock to their fighting capacity. One such shock would be large-scale transfers of ammunition and weaponry to Afghan troops whose supplies had been depleted before the withdrawal of foreign troops. Prior theoretical work suggests this would lead to a composition shift in combat (Bueno de Mesquita 2013), reducing close-range attacks and increasing roadside bomb deployment. However, Tables 1 and 4 indicate that this type of tactical shift did not occur following the handover. Overall, we fail to identify any clear evidence consistent with short-lived tactical complementarities that could explain the main results.

C. Lying Low

One compelling mechanism that could account for our findings is a strategic decision by the Taliban to scale back violence during the transition period. Local security transfers were particularly important because they created an overwatch period in which the relative capacity of the Taliban and the ANSF was signaled to ISAF forces. As such, the Taliban had an incentive to understate its capacity in a manner that was both difficult to detect, and that confirmed NATO forces' biases (i.e., that Afghan security forces were ably trained and capable of delivering security on their own). We briefly formalize this logic in a simple game in which violence serves as a signal about the relative capacities of the Taliban and the ANSF. This formalization helps situate the conflict patterns we observe as the equilibrium outcome

of a plausible, albeit stylized, strategic interaction between combatants during a foreign-to-local security transition.

A Simple Model of Lying Low.—Our model studies the interaction between a local Taliban group and an ISAF unit as a signaling game. We assume that the capacity of the ANSF versus the Taliban is $\theta \in \{0, 1\}$, the cost for the Taliban of staging attacks. Importantly, θ cannot be observed directly by ISAF. In the first period of the game, ISAF maintains its full capacity $\mu > 1$. ISAF chooses to enter overwatch (i.e., not to use capacity against the Taliban) during the first phase of the transition (period 1). The Taliban chooses the level of attacks $a \in \{0, 1\}$ according to the objective function: $[a - \theta a]$. If the game would end in the first period, it is clear that the Taliban would choose $a = 1$ if $\theta = 0$.

To capture the transition dynamics, we assume that ISAF makes a final decision to maintain capacity or not at the start of period 2. In the parameters of the model, this means that ISAF can keep $\mu > 1$ (i.e., the initial level), or scale down to $\mu = 0$. Maintaining μ in period 2 costs c . This cost includes the direct cost of maintaining capacity, but it also incorporates the large political costs of maintaining a military presence.¹¹ As in period 1, the insurgents attack according to their objective function in period 2. We assume that the Taliban does not just engage with the ANSF in period 2, but also with ISAF, which uses its remaining capacity μ . So, the second-period objective function is: $[a_2 - (\theta + \mu)a_2]$. We give the second-period weight $\chi > 1$, as we assume the Taliban puts more weight on the long-term, post-transition period.

The order of the game can be summarized as follows:

- (i) Nature draws $\theta \in \{0, 1\}$ with $E(\theta) = \sigma$.
- (ii) The Taliban chooses $a_1 \in \{0, 1\}$.
- (iii) The Taliban receives a period 1 pay-off $[a_1 - \theta a_1]$; the period 1 payoff for ISAF does not matter.
- (iv) ISAF observes a_1 and chooses $\mu_2 \in \{0, \mu\}$.
- (v) The Taliban chooses $a_2 \in \{0, 1\}$.
- (vi) The period 2 payoffs for the Taliban: $\chi[a_2 - (\theta + \mu_2)a_2]$.
- (vii) The period 2 payoffs for ISAF: $[-a_2 - c\mu_2]$.

A pooling equilibrium now exists with $a_1 = 0$ and $\mu_2 = 0$ if $1 - \sigma < c\mu < 1$. In period 2, $a_2 = 0$ if the Taliban has low capacity relative to the ANSF ($\theta = 1$), and $a_2 = 1$ if the Taliban has high capacity. The pooling equilibrium where the Taliban is a high type is consistent with the empirical results we observe. In this

¹¹For a discussion of the political costs of maintaining a military presence, see Marinov, Nomikos, and Robbins (2015).

case, violence levels would be low during the initial period, ISAF would withdraw, and violence levels would increase after withdrawal.¹²

Stylized Facts about the Transition.—The stylized model has two features that deserve further discussion in the context of Afghanistan’s transition: that ISAF learns about the relative fighting capacity of the Taliban, and the assumption that ISAF does not use violence in period 1.

The model assumes that the local Taliban’s type while fighting Afghan forces is unknown to ISAF. During an extended conflict where combatants update about their opponent’s type, this assumption may seem implausible (Powell 2006). While ISAF continually assessed their relative capabilities, less was known about the battlefield readiness of the ANSF to take on the Taliban, especially at a local level. This was due to several factors. Credible intelligence about Taliban force strength was thin. Attrition within ANSF ranks was severe, with as many as 33 percent of troops turning over each year. Battlefield preparation trackers were highly subjective, with evaluation standards changing during the transition, and ISAF changing the level of evaluation from the battalions to brigades: effectively losing track of information about local preparedness.¹³ Observing how the conflict developed during the security handover was the first signal foreign troops had about how local Afghan troops would handle their new operational command role fighting the Taliban. Official US Department of Defense (DoD) documents suggest that international forces thought they were learning about the relative capacity of the ANSF and Taliban, and that signals from the handover phase were interpreted positively. As a communique dated July 2013, when the transition was ongoing, noted, “During the reporting period, the ANSF has performed effectively in the field, losing no major bases or district centers to the insurgency and protecting the majority of the Afghan population. Although challenges remain, the ANSF demonstrated an increasing level of effectiveness.”¹⁴

In the model, ISAF chooses to enter overwatch during the first phase of the transition. As such, it does not use its capacity against the Taliban during the first period of the game; instead it hands over operational command to the ANSF and observes the level of violence produced by the Taliban. As argued in the previous paragraph, this period could have allowed ISAF to update its priors about the relative capacity of the Taliban versus the ANSF.¹⁵ The historical context suggests

¹²Wittman (1979) points out that a unilateral reduction in conflict intensity can prolong conflict though for distinct reasons. In Wittman’s discussion, a unilateral reduction in violence reduces military costs, and results in fewer casualties, lowering political costs for both sides. In our case, the Taliban’s reduction in violence facilitated withdrawal (because political costs remained high for NATO countries), and weakened the remaining military forces (the ANSF).

¹³We provide additional details in online Appendix Section C.

¹⁴See “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” Department of Defense, April 2011, <https://bit.ly/3fPYhdb>.

¹⁵Under the pooling equilibrium, ISAF does not receive meaningful information about the Taliban’s type, but it also does not experience significant battlefield losses (since the Taliban produces a low level of violence). It is possible to model an explicit benefit for ISAF to go in overwatch in period 1. For example, if the Taliban is nonstrategic (or impatient) with a certain probability. In this extension, the Taliban will sometimes reveal its type in period 1, which allows ISAF to adjust its withdrawal decision. Our model can also be reinterpreted: μ_2 could capture a sticky investment by ISAF in the local ANSF capacity, even if ISAF has committed to withdraw in period 2 under all circumstances. It is also worth noting that the model has a semi-separating equilibrium (which is not a good explanation of the observed almost complete withdrawal of ISAF, but could be consistent with investments in ANSF capacity) in which the Taliban’s action in period 1 is informative.

there were additional reasons for why ISAF would not use its fighting capacity during the handover phase. First, ISAF did not have the military authority to deviate from the handover schedule. Second, reverting from overwatch would have disrupted the new command structure. Such a change would have also visibly undermined the authority of local forces in the communities where they conducted patrols and operations, potentially reducing public confidence in the long-run ability of Afghan troops to effectively provide security. More broadly, political leaders of troop-sending countries made their commitment to the security transition public, repeatedly referring to the process as “irreversible,”¹⁶ in an effort to raise the political costs of stalling or reversing the handover.

We cannot fully rule out a variant of the “lying low” mechanism whereby the Taliban reduce violence to speed up the transition logistically, even if NATO’s beliefs of the relative fighting capacity of the Taliban are irrelevant to the transition process. However, we think the stylized signaling model we present matches the historical context well, particularly the overwatch period, as highlighted in this subsection.

D. Policy Relevance

Our study addresses a topic of substantial economic and policy significance: the transition of military control to local forces after an international military intervention. Our findings suggest that insurgents acted strategically around the withdrawal, responding to the two phases differently. Violence decreased after the announcement of the local transition of security forces, but increased after the physical withdrawal of troops. We suggest that the Taliban calibrated its violence to manipulate the signals that ISAF received about both the capacity of local security forces and the strength of the insurgency. Once the political costs of re-intervention had become sufficiently high, rebels expanded their combat operations. Withdrawal schedules, thus, might endanger post-occupation stability by tying the hands of political and military leaders.¹⁷ In this respect, the experience of Afghanistan is not unique. To unpack the policy relevance of the Afghan security transition, we briefly introduce facts from two historical cases: the Soviet Union’s transfer of power to Afghan forces in 1989, and the end of US-led operations in Iraq in 2011. Each of these cases reveal similar patterns of insurgent violence declining during the initial phase of the security transition and surging after the final withdrawal of foreign troops.

Soviet forces first entered Afghanistan in 1979 in an attempt to support communist government forces. The mission was narrowly defined as a stabilization effort intended to help the government consolidate control over the outlying provinces (Gompert, Binnendijk, and Lin 2014). The first formal plans for withdrawal were drafted in 1985. In 1988, the Afghan Geneva Accords were signed, leading to a temporary ceasefire and a publicly announced timetable for Soviet withdrawal in 1989. The subsequent decline in insurgent activity raised expectations about a successful handover of security. However, after the withdrawal, mujahideen forces

¹⁶See Matt Spetalnick and Missy Ryan, “NATO Sets ‘Irreversible But Risky Course to End Afghan War,” *Reuters*, <https://reut.rs/3mndyEV>.

¹⁷Not all interventions end with a formal, staggered withdrawal schedule. The Italian-led intervention in Albania (Operation Alba), for example, rapidly transitioned policing operations back to local forces following a national election (Perlmutter 1998, Dobbins et al. 2008).

abandoned the ceasefire agreement and engaged in open attacks on government compounds. By that point in time, the political costs of another intervention were too great. Three years later, Soviet economic assistance was withdrawn, and the Afghan government was unable to pay salaries, bribe tribal militias, or manage the economy. During this period of instability and fighting between rival mujahideen factions, the Taliban emerged, eventually establishing control over most of the country (with the exception of some northern provinces) by 1998. Rebel forces strategically reduced violence levels until after foreign troops withdrew and the political costs of conducting another intervention were prohibitive (Smith 2014), a situation that has striking parallels to the Afghanistan security transition we study in this paper. The subsequent political instability, which is similar to the political situation that has unfolded in Afghanistan after the NATO withdrawal, created a window of opportunity for opposition forces to consolidate territorial control without directly confronting well-equipped Soviet fighters. Despite the parallels between this historical episode and the recent security transition in Afghanistan, the political factions that formed the core mujahideen resistance forces and the modern Taliban are largely distinct. This suggests that similarities across the Soviet and NATO withdrawals are not simply a repeated strategy by the same military actors. Instead, these consistent patterns of violence suggest how insurgents can strategically respond to foreign-to-local security transitions.

The transfer of power following the US-led operations in Iraq also exhibits strong parallels to the recent Afghan transition. In 2008, the Status of Forces Agreement laid out the timeline for withdrawal. Starting in July 2009, US troops no longer patrolled in urban centers. In September 2010, operational control over primary security provision was handed over to Iraqi troops. During this period, 50,000 US troops remained in Iraq to support the transition, and violence decreased sharply. After the administrations of US President Barack Obama and Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki failed to reach a consensus on legal immunity for US forces, the US prepared for a complete withdrawal by mid-December 2011. The conflict reemerged during and after this phase of the security transition. Several high-profile attacks targeted the Iraqi parliament and a number of transferred US military bases; a large-scale insurgent assault took place in Basra. As Lake (2019, 258) points out, withdrawal enabled al-Maliki to take complete control over security, including cutting funding for the Sunni-backed Awakening Forces. Following this last phase of the security transition, sectarian violence flared. By 2014, the Islamic State (IS) emerged as a major threat to Iraqi security, capturing the city of Mosul.

These cases suggest that the patterns of violence we observe in Afghanistan may reflect a broader conflict dynamic that emerges from the withdrawals of foreign occupations as wars end. These historical transitions confirm that insights from the findings of our study may generalize to other contexts, including ongoing peace negotiations with the Taliban.

The Trump administration reentered negotiations with the Taliban in late 2019 after the failed meeting at Camp David scheduled for the week of September 11. After agreeing to a temporary seven-day ceasefire between combatants, the Taliban coordinated a drawdown of its forces, and significantly reduced attack activity. US officials, in turn, agreed to the first phase of a peace deal, which was signed on February 29, 2020. This first phase includes releasing 5,000 Taliban

fighters from Afghan government prisons, and a diplomatic engagement with the elected government of President Ashraf Ghani. The signing ceremony, attended by US Special Representative Zalmay Khalilzad and Taliban leader Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, was touted as a symbolic victory by the Taliban. Classified intelligence collected since the first-phase agreement was signed suggests that the Taliban is prepared to violate the terms of this peace agreement and overwhelm the Ghani government once US forces withdraw, which parallels the dynamics that surfaced with the withdrawal of both Soviet forces in 1989 and the majority of NATO forces in 2014.¹⁸ Despite reassurances from the US Secretary of Defense that the United States would “not hesitate to nullify the agreement,” President Donald Trump has stated his view more bluntly. When asked about the intelligence suggesting the Taliban were planning to overrun the government, he said, “Countries have to take care of themselves ... You can only hold someone’s hand for so long.”¹⁹

V. Conclusion

Our analysis of the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan reveals a troubling pattern: a short-term reduction in conflict in the first phase of security handovers, followed by a surge in violence as actual departures took place. Our findings suggest that such short-run impacts of the security transition may appear to be positive and meaningful. Indeed, in the case of Afghanistan, they led to the prevailing belief at the time that local forces were more capable, and that the Taliban forces had grown weaker sooner than had been expected. However, these effects reversed themselves as the transition entered a new phase, with the actual withdrawal of international troops.

This article makes several contributions to the economics of conflict literature. Prior work has largely focused on economic causes of civil conflict, and government use of economic incentives, typically development aid, to quell violence during the course of an insurgency. Largely ignored are questions about the conditions under which security transitions can successfully transfer military power to local forces. We are able to explore these questions by bringing together highly detailed conflict microdata with survey measures that enable us to test how combat activity changes during a security transition, and, perhaps more importantly, to explore how public perceptions and attitudes are influenced by the foreign-to-local handover. This paper opens up a new set of research questions about the industrial organization of coalitions at war. Moreover, it raises basic questions about how transitions resolve the hazards of jointly producing security.

Our results also suggest several actionable insights for managing international military interventions. First, announcing a prolonged timeline for withdrawal may create opportunities for opposition forces to strategically respond to the intervention. In particular, insurgents may simply wait out the withdrawal, a contention that

¹⁸ See Courtney Kube, Ken Dilanian, and Dan De Luce, “US Has Persuasive Intel Taliban Do Not Intend to Abide by Terms of Peace Deal, Officials Say,” *NBC News*, March 6, 2020, <https://nbcnews.to/33v1XfD>.

¹⁹ See Saphora Smith et al., “US Sees Taliban Deal as Exit from Afghanistan: Militants See It as a Victory over the Superpower,” *NBC News*, March 3, 2020, <https://nbcnews.to/39zvvnwZ>; and news article cited in footnote 18.

has been frequently raised by some US politicians, and is now corroborated by our evidence. By conserving their fighting capacity, rebels may implicitly (or explicitly) manipulate the signals that international organizations and coalition forces receive about the relative capabilities of local government forces. Benchmarks may or may not be useful in a context in which rivals are “holding their punches.” This point is made more poignant by US Defense Department assessments conducted during the transition, which interpreted the short-run reductions in violence as evidence that local Afghan forces were prepared for their long-term mission of providing security after the coalition withdrawal.

Second, local force preparation should be reconsidered. Our findings suggest that Afghan security forces were *not* adequately prepared for the large-scale withdrawal of ISAF; this is the case even though the US Congress alone allocated \$60.7 billion to training and arming the Afghan security forces, including their national military and police forces. The Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR) has conducted several high-profile investigations of the US effort to enhance Afghan forces, noting “ghost” soldiers, poor training, and widespread corruption in hiring.²⁰ The recent declassification of the Afghanistan Papers, a compilation of retrospective interviews conducted by SIGAR, makes this point even clearer; resources were siphoned from official projects to enrich political elites, warlords, and the Taliban. Of the roughly 400 interviews conducted, 129 explicitly mention concerns about the role of corruption in undermining economic growth, political stability, and security provision in Afghanistan. Corruption represents a first-order threat to successful security transitions and sustainable state-building efforts. The handover of foreign-owned assets (including vehicles, weaponry, ammunition, and basic supplies) was also a notable legal hurdle, which may have hindered the preparation of Afghan forces for long-term security provision. Reevaluating how local forces receive training, and regularly auditing these forces may stabilize future security transitions.

Finally, future security transitions should maintain stronger data collection efforts even after international forces withdraw. This study reinforces the importance of robust, ongoing data collection and government commitments to data dissemination. Although our survey data enable us to track public perceptions until 2016, our tactical records effectively end earlier. The platform used to collect combat operation activity was used less consistently after the end of the NATO mission. While we are able to estimate the short- and medium-run consequences of the transition using these military records, longer-term dynamics cannot be studied. The way that military interventions end likely have profound consequences on economic development and political stability. It is therefore imperative to continually collect and share data, even after security transitions end, to inform future economic and policy decisions.

²⁰ See Statement of John F. Sopko, Testimony before the Subcommittee on National Security, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, US House of Representatives, “Why ANSF Numbers Matter: Inaccurate and Unreliable Data, and Limited Oversight of On-Budget Assistance Put Millions of US Taxpayer Dollars at Risk,” April 29, 2015, <https://bit.ly/37kLED3>.

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