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Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance
Filipe R. Campante, Quoc-Anh Do, and Bernardo Guimaraes
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. Jul 2019, Vol. 11, No. 3: Pages 298-337

Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance†

Filipe R. Campante1, Quoc-Anh Do2 and Bernardo Guimaraes3

1School of Advanced International Studies and Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University, 1740 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20036, and NBER (email: )

2Department of Economics, Sciences Po, 28 Rue des Saints-Pères, 75007 Paris, France and LIEPP, and CEPR (email: )

3Sao Paulo School of Economics - FGV; R Itapeva 474, São Paulo, SP 01332-000, Brazil (email: )

Abstract

We investigate the links between capital cities, conflict, and the quality of governance, starting from the assumption that incumbent elites are constrained by the threat of insurrection, and that the latter is rendered less effective by distance from the seat of political power. We show evidence that (i) conflict is more likely to emerge (and dislodge incumbents) closer to the capital, and (ii) isolated capitals are associated with misgovernance. The results hold only for relatively nondemocratic countries and for intrastate conflicts over government (as opposed to territory)—exactly the cases where our central assumption should apply. (JEL D72, D74, O17, O18, R12)